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ABSTRACT 
SOCIAL NETWORKS, SOCIAL SUPPORT, AND MENTAL HEALTH IN CROSS-NATIONAL 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
Ning Hsieh 
Jason Schnittker 
The dissertation contributes to the sociology of mental health by demonstrating that institutional and 
cultural settings shape the level of social cohesion and its influence on mental well-being. The dissertation 
consists of three independent but complementary essays. The first essay examines the influence of contexts 
on the link between social cohesion and suicide risk across countries in Americas, East Asia, and Europe. 
Using multilevel analysis, I show that marriage, parenthood, co-residence with parents, religious 
participation, and general social trust are all differentially related to suicide rates by region of the world. 
Whether a cohesive relationship is protective against suicide depends on contextual factors such as stigma 
against marital dissolution, welfare state regime, and the strength of religious networks. This essay contests 
Durkheim’s theory on social cohesion and suicide by showcasing the international variation in the “benefits” 
of social cohesion. In the second essay, I examine the role of social cohesion and economic security in the 
mental health disparity between two societies in transition—China and Russia. The results show that the 
lower level of depressive symptoms among Chinese is in part attributed to their higher economic security 
and social cohesion (e.g., trust and perceived safety in the neighborhood). The findings suggest that reform 
policy and institutional capacity of the state contribute to differences in social and economic resources and 
mental health outcomes between China and Russia. In the final essay, I compare the structure of core 
personal networks in three societies—China, Japan, and the U.S. The results show that structural aspects of 
social networks, including size, density, proportion of kin confidants, and frequency of contact, vary 
considerably between countries. Nevertheless, none of these countries seems to have a “better” social 
network structure than another. In fact, the findings challenge the conventional cultural notion of Eastern 
collectivism vs. Western individualism. The study suggests that the significantly lower prevalence of 
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mental disorders in China and Japan compared to the U.S. cannot be explained by country-level differences 
in the strength of personal networks. 
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CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND SUICIDE IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE: A NEW LOOK AT DURKHEIM’S OLD INQUIRY 
 
Introduction 
Suicide is one of the crucial indicators of health and well-being. According to the WHO, 
it is among the top twenty leading causes of death for all ages worldwide, and among the 
three leading causes of death for people aged 15-44 in some countries (World Health 
Organization 2012). Not only is suicide linked to individuals’ psychological and 
physiological health, but it is also a product of social and cultural conditions. 
Sociological research, greatly influenced by Durkheim’s theory on solidarity, emphasizes 
that disrupted social relationships are an important risk factor for suicide (Durkheim 1897; 
Wray, Colen, and Pescosolido 2011). In particular, Durkheimian studies argue that 
maintaining social ties, such as being married, having children, and belonging to a 
religious community, provide social support and social control that prevent individuals 
from feeling detached, frustrated, or despaired and from committing suicide.  
 Although social cohesion has been recognized as a crucial determinant of suicide, 
few studies have examined whether it contributes to the wide variation in suicide rates 
across regions and countries. In particular, the WHO Map of Suicide Rates suggests that 
suicide rates demonstrates a clear regional pattern (World Health Organization 2012). For 
example, East Asian and Eastern European countries have higher levels of suicide rates; 
U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have medium levels of suicide rates; Latin 
American countries generally show low levels of suicide rates. However, little is known 
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about whether differences in social cohesion, including marriage/cohabiting rates and 
frequency of religious participation, drive this regional pattern of suicide. Moreover, few 
studies have investigated the varying effects of social relationships on suicide risk across 
contexts. Due to different cultural and institutional practices, such as social acceptability 
of divorce, expectation of intergenerational transfers (e.g., adult children take care of 
elderly parents), and state welfare regime, societies may unequally benefit from social 
relationships. For instance, co-residence with parents may be more strongly associated 
with reduced suicide rates in places where public support for elderly care is scarce and 
(upward) intergenerational transfers are culturally expected. Because the majority of 
previous research focuses on a single context or a set of industrialized contexts with 
relatively similar cultural and/or institutional backgrounds (i.e., Western Europe and 
North America), how social contexts may shape the influence of social cohesion on 
suicide risk has been rarely discussed.  
This article examines suicide rates in relation to social relationships, including 
marital relationship, intergenerational relationship, religious participation, and general 
social trust, across 42 countries in 7 regions of the world. The study investigates whether 
the “protective” effects of cohesive relationships on suicide risk vary across regions and 
whether the level of social cohesion explains regional variation in suicide rates. From a 
comparative perspective, the study challenges the simplicity of Durkheim’s theory on 
solidarity and suicide by arguing that not all types of cohesive relationships are linked to 
lower suicide risk in all settings, and that institutional and cultural factors shape the 
association between social relationships and suicide.  
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Social Relationships and Suicide 
Research based on Durkheim's (1897) theoretical proposition argues that cohesive social 
relationships may reduce suicide risk through two major mechanisms: social integration 
and social regulation (Berkman and Glass 2000; House, Umberson, and Landis 1988; 
Van Tubergen, Grotenhuis, and Ultee 2005; Wray, Colen, and Pescosolido 2011). On the 
one hand, social integration provides a sense of belonging and sources of emotional and 
instrumental support that may enhance mental well-being. On the other hand, social 
regulation provides moral guidance and monitoring that restrain personal desires and 
deviant behavior, which in turn may lead to failure, frustration, and despair. Studies 
following Durkheim’s tradition mostly focus on his egoistic and anomic suicide, both of 
which suggest that suicide occurs more often when there is a lack of social interactions, 
shared beliefs, sentiments, and goals, and formal or informal rules that could hold 
individuals’ behavior in check (Johnson 1965; Minagawa 2013; Wray, Colen, and 
Pescosolido 2011).  
In order to elaborate, revise, or advance Durkheim’s theory, many studies have  
examined the association between social relationships and suicide in contemporary  
settings. The majority of these studies focus on marital dissolution and religious  
affiliation. Overall, findings are mixed, demonstrating some geographical or temporal  
variation in the effects of social ties. In particular, while some studies claim that divorce  
and separation are positively related to suicide rates (Cutler, Glaeser, and Norberg 2001;  
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Gunnell et al. 2003; Luoma and Pearson 2002; Messner et al. 2006; Phillips et al. 2002),  
others argue that the effects of marital dissolution are not significant (Kposowa, Breault,  
and Singh 1995; Norström 1995). Several studies further indicate that whether divorce  
encourages suicide ideation or attempt may depend on the prevalence of divorce in a  
region or a period (Pampel 1998; Stack 1990). As divorce becomes more common and  
socially accepted, the gap of suicide rates between the divorced and the married narrows.  
In other words, the potential harmful effects of marital dissolution on suicide risk may be  
attenuated in contexts where divorced individuals are less stigmatized. 
 Likewise, the religion-suicide association may also be contingent on local settings. 
Although the protective effects of religious affiliation against suicide are richly 
documented (Duberstein et al. 2004; Neeleman and Lewis 1999; Stack and Kposowa 
2011; Van Tubergen, Grotenhuis, and Ultee 2005), the strength and direction of the 
effects may vary. Specifically, religious homogeneity is associated with reduced suicide 
rates (Ellison, Burr, and McCall 1997), and the availability of religiously similar 
individuals in local areas defines the protectiveness of a religion, no matter it is 
Catholicism, Protestantism, or Judaism (Ellison, Burr, and McCall 1997; Pescosolido 
1990; Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989; Wray, Colen, and Pescosolido 2011). Even 
Catholicism, which is historically well-known for its strong protection against suicide, 
can be linked to elevated suicide rates in the American South because the region lacks an 
integrated and supportive community for Catholics (Pescosolido 1990). Overall, the key 
issue is not whether individuals formally identify themselves as a believer, but whether 
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they (can) actively involve themselves in a religious community that provides strong 
social support and social control.  
 In addition to marital dissolution and religious participation, a few studies have 
also shown that other types of relationships, such as familial integration, friendship, and 
general trust are negatively associated with suicide risk.  Specifically, parenthood is 
negatively related to suicide rates particularly for women. Among married women, 
number of children predicts lower suicide rates, independent of socioeconomic status 
(Hoyer and Lund 1993). Further, married women who commit suicide tend to do so later 
than their male counterparts (Cantor and Slater 1995). These studies suggest that women 
are more protected against suicide by their greater responsibilities for child rearing and 
their closer ties to children. In addition, friends provide another source of social support 
that may enhance mental health and lower suicide risk. Having more friends is associated 
with fewer depressive symptoms (Ueno 2005). In contrast, isolation from friends and a 
friendship network of lower density (i.e., one’s friends are not friends with each other) 
are both linked to more suicide thoughts (Bearman and Moody 2004). Lastly, general 
trust or perception that most people can be trusted, an indicator of cohesion between 
individuals and society at large, is also associated with lower suicide rates (Helliwell 
2006).  
 As the majority of previous studies focus on a single context or a set of 
homogeneous settings, there is a limited understanding regarding how cultural and 
institutional factors may shape the relationship between social cohesion and suicide. In 
particular, few studies have compared suicide risk between countries outside the 
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Western/Industrialized boundary even if non-Western or less industrialized countries 
disproportionately show the highest or the lowest suicide rates (World Health 
Organization 2012). By leaving out these comparison cases, the literature misses an 
important opportunity to test the dominant theory of Durkheim from a perspective of 
diversity. While a number of studies have explored the contextual variation in the effects 
of marital dissolution and religious affiliation on suicide rates, more research on a 
broader range of national/cultural settings using various social cohesion indicators is 
required to expand our understanding of how contexts interact with social relationships to 
restrain or encourage suicide risk.  
 
Hypotheses 
I. Globally or generally, cohesive social relationships are associated with lower risk of 
suicide. 
II. Even though the global (general) effects of social relationships are protective against 
suicide as described in Hypothesis I, the effects vary significantly across regions of the 
world because of different institutional and cultural practices.  
III. Considering the varying effects of social cohesion on suicide across regions 
(according to Hypothesis II), level of social cohesion such as marital dissolution rate does 
not explain the cross-regional disparities in suicide risk. 
   
 

7
Data and Methods 
Data and Settings  
The data come from three different sources. Age-gender-country-specific suicide rates 
(dependent variable) for people aged 15 and above come from the WHO Mortality 
Database1. In most cases, a country has 14 observations of suicide rates in a year (2 
genders x 7 age groups2). Further, the variables of social relationships come from the 
World Values Survey (WVS). Unlike suicide rates being aggregate data, social 
relationships from the WVS are individual-level data. Therefore, I calculated the mean of 
each relationship variable for every age-gender-country group so that the indicators of 
social relationships can be matched with suicide rates at the same level of analysis. 
Finally, GDP per capita, a country-specific control variable, are collected from the World 
Bank.  
The study includes 42 countries from 7 regions of the world3: East Asia (Hong 
Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan), English-speaking countries (Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Latin 
America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), 
Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), Western Europe (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands), Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Portugal, and Spain), and Eastern Europe (Czech, Hungary, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia).  

1 The only exception is that the age-gender-country-specific suicide rates in Taiwan come from the 
Department of Health, Executive Yuan, Taiwan. ʳ
2 Age groups are defined as follows: 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, and 75 and above. 
3 The major criterion for country selection is the availability of complete and comparable data of both 
suicide rates and social relationships. 
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While this regional classification is mainly based on United Nation’s geographical 
definition (except for English-speaking countries), the classification has more than a 
geographical meaning. In particular, countries classified in the same region are relatively 
proximal on cultural dimensions, including language, religious belief, and expectation of 
intergenerational transfers within a household. Further, the state welfare policy is also 
roughly aligned with the regional categorization. Specifically, Esping-Anderson (1990, 
1999) argues that Anglophone countries tend to provide relatively modest and means-
tested social benefits (the liberal welfare state). In contrast, Northern European countries 
pursue the principle of universal social rights, promoting an equality of high living 
standard rather than an equality of minimal need (the social democratic welfare state). 
Between these two welfare regimes, some Western and Southern European countries 
adopt a welfare policy that neither heavily relies on the market nor on the state; the policy 
preserves both social stratification and the tradition of family, that is, social rights are 
granted according to class and status and after the family’s capacity of caring is 
exhausted (the conservative welfare state). In addition, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) 
also suggest that countries in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe have 
developed distinctive social-welfare models. Particularly, welfare systems in East Asia 
offered minimal social security; rather, many growth- or development-oriented states in 
this region prioritize investment in education. Many Latin American countries provide 
generous but unequal entitlements; their welfare system protects formal-sector workers 
including urban middle class and some blue-collar workers, but excludes peasants and 
informal-sector workers. Finally, due to the Communist legacy, Eastern European 
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welfare systems aim to provide comprehensive benefits to almost all of their citizens 
even though the value of protections and the quality of services have deteriorated with the 
state’s financial capacity. Overall, the classification of region allows the study to examine 
how institutional and cultural circumstances shape the link between social cohesion and 
suicide risk. 
The period of study spans from 1981 to 2006, during which the World Values 
Survey conducted its first five waves of data collection4. However, because the countries 
may participate in different waves of data collection for an unequal number of times, the 
years and the number of observations vary across countries. On average, each country is 
involved in three WVS surveys throughout the period (see Appendix). The final sample 
includes 1,687 observations of age-gender-country groups over time. 
 
Statistical Approach 
I first use OLS linear regression to test whether social integration is negatively related to 
suicide rates in general (Hypothesis I). The OLS regression models assume that the 
effects of social relationships on suicide are the same across regions of the world. The 
assumption that all social relationships are equally “protective” against suicide, however, 
may not be reasonable. Given that values, norms, and institutions vary widely across 
social contexts, the “beneficial” effects of social cohesion may differ significantly by 
region. To address this concern, I then use multilevel linear regression with random-slope 
specification to test the Hypotheses II and III. The random-slope models allow coefficient 

4 The World Values Survey collected five waves of data in 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, 
and 2005-2007.  
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estimates to vary across regions. Therefore, these models can test whether the direction 
and magnitude of the association between social relationships and suicide risk differ from 
region to region (Hypothesis II). Moreover, I use the same models to test whether the 
level of social cohesion explains regional differences in suicide rates (Hypothesis III). 
The random-slope models have two levels, with age-gender-country groups (the 
lower level) nested in seven world regions (the higher level). I use region rather than 
country as the higher unit of analysis for a few reasons. First, a significant proportion of 
the between-country variation in suicide rates can be attributed to the between-region 
variation. Specifically, controlling for regional difference in suicide rates reduces the 
between-country variation by 68%. This not only demonstrates the salience of region 
over country, but also supports the regional clustering of suicide rates shown by the 
WHO Map of Suicide Rates (World Health Organization 2012). Additionally, region is 
much more statistically powerful than country as a higher unit of analysis simply because 
a region contains more age-gender-country-specific observations (125 n 349) than a 
country does (14 n 84). For these reasons, region rather than country is chosen to be 
the higher level in the multilevel linear regression model. 
 
Variables 
Suicide rates are measured by the number of deaths resulted from intentional self-harm 
per 100,000 person-years (approximated by per 100,000 mid-year population). The rates 
are calculated by age group, gender, country, and year. According to the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), deaths caused by intentional self-harm include, for 
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example, intentionally self-inflicted poisoning, hanging, drowning, firearm discharge, 
jumping from a high place, and crashing of motor vehicle; these causes of death are 
coded as X60-X84 in the ICD 10th revision and as E950-E959 in the ICD 9th revision. 
Previous studies argue that official suicide statistics may suffer from the misclassification 
and underreport of suicide deaths (Douglas 1967; Kapusta et al. 2011; Pescosolido and 
Mendelsohn 1986; Timmermans 2013; Whitt 2006). In particular, deaths of intentional 
self-harm may be misclassified as deaths of injury with undetermined intent, 
unintentional poisoning, and unintentional drowning (O’Carroll 1989; Rockett 2010; 
Rockett and Thomas 1999; Värnik et al. 2010). Because the extent of misreporting also 
depends on cultural and institutional factors, such as stigma against suicide, resources for 
forensic death investigations, and the adoption of a coronial or medico-legal system 
(Douglas 1967; Kapusta et al. 2011; Timmermans 2013; Whitt 2006; Värnik et al. 2010), 
the undercount of suicide deaths could significantly bias results from cross-nationally 
comparative research. To address this concern, I conduct a sensitivity analysis that 
considers the death rates of injury with undetermined intent, unintentional poisoning, and 
unintentional drowning. 
Social relationships, from the strongest to the weakest social ties, are examined in 
this study. First, marital relationship represents the most inner layer of relational structure. 
I use the percentage of people currently divorced or separated (in a age-gender-country 
group) to measure the strength of this intimate relationship. Intergenerational 
relationships are the next layer of social connection. They are measured by two variables: 
the number of children and the percentage of people living with parents. Further, 
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religious participation may provide additional social support and social regulation outside 
family circle. The percentage of people attending religious services at least once a month 
is used to measure this layer of relationship. Lastly, general social trust indicates the 
relationship between individuals and society at large; it represents the weakest tie that 
shapes the outer layer of social networks. Trust is measured by the percentage of people 
reporting that most people can be trusted. 
All the regression analyses in this study control for gender, age group, time trend, 
version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), and GDP per capita.  
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Both suicide rates and social relationships vary significantly across world regions (Table 
1.1). Overall, Eastern Europe has the highest suicide rates, followed by East Asia, 
Western Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, English-speaking countries, and 
finally Latin America. Regional difference is significant: suicide rates in Eastern Europe 
are about 3 times higher than those in Latin America. Moreover, levels of social cohesion, 
represented by marital dissolution, number of children, co-residence with parents, 
religious participation, and general trust, also vary significantly from region to region. In 
particular, East Asians are the least likely to be currently divorced or separated (2.4%); in 
contrast, Northern Europeans are the most likely to be in this marital status (8.2%). 
Further, Latin Americans on average have a relatively high number of children (2.7 
persons), especially compared to Northern Europeans (1.7 persons). In addition, co-
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residence with parents is quite common in East Asia (31.2%); however, the prevalence in 
Northern Europe (8.4%) is relatively low. Also, regular attendance at religious services is 
much more prevalent in Latin American (55.8%) than in Northern Europe (12.8%); on 
the contrary, the majority of Northern Europeans express trust in most people (62.0%), 
whereas only a minority of people in Latin America does so (17.7%). 
 Because social relationships are not consistently more or less integrated in one 
region than another, it is indeed difficult to tell whether cohesive relationships are 
negatively associated with suicide rates by glancing over the descriptive statistics. 
However, the statistics seem to show that social cohesion is established on different types 
of relationships across region, and that people in all these regions are well-integrated by 
at least one or two types of relationships. Specifically, East Asians and Southern 
Europeans do relatively well on marital and intergenerational relationships (in terms of 
co-residence with parents); people from English-speaking countries have relative 
strengths in parenthood, involvement in religious communities, and general trust; Latin 
Americans maintain the strongest connection through religious participation and 
parenthood; Northern Europeans show their advantage in general trust. Finally, while 
Western and Eastern Europeans do not have relative strengths in specific social ties, 
neither do they show obvious weaknesses.  
 
OLS Linear Regression  
The OLS regression models support the Hypothesis I: cohesive social relationships are 
generally associated with lower risk of suicide (Table 1.2). First, the baseline model 
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demonstrates that East Asia, the reference region, has higher suicide rates than all the 
other regions except Eastern Europe when the control variables are held constant (Model 
1). In particular, suicide rates in Latin America are only 32% (i.e., exp(-1.13)) of the 
suicide rates in East Asia. Suicide rates in Southern Europe, English-speaking countries, 
Northern Europe, and Western Europe are 37%, 56%, 81%, and 84% of the rates in East 
Asia, respectively. Furthermore, maintaining cohesive relationships generally predicts 
lower risk of suicide. Specifically, an increase in divorce and separation rates by 1 
percentage point is related to a 0.6% (i.e., exp(0.006)-1) increase in suicide rates (Model 
2). Also, having one more child is associated with an 24% (i.e., 1-exp(-0.273)) decrease 
in suicide rates (Model 3). Similarly, living with parents, attending religious services on a 
regular basis, and trusting people are all significantly related to lower suicide rates 
(Models 4-6). This pattern persists when the social relationship variables are examined 
altogether in a single model, except that the effect of marital dissolution turns 
insignificant (Model 7).  
 Overall, the OLS models suggest that marital dissolution predicts higher levels of 
suicide rates, and parenthood, co-residence with parents, participation in religious 
communities, and general social trust all predict lower levels of suicide rates. However, 
these models assume that the protective effects of social cohesion are the same across 
regions of the world, which is unjustified if there is significant variation in the effects of 
social relationships across regions. In the following section I use multilevel linear 
regression to relax this assumption. 
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Multilevel Linear Regression: Random-Slope Models 
As Hypothesis II predicts, the random-slope models indicate that all the social 
relationships examined in this study are differentially associated with suicide rates across 
regions. This is demonstrated by that the standard deviations of the marginal effects of 
social relationships are all significantly different from zero (Table 1.3). Moreover, 
Figures 1.1 ranks the marginal effects by the direction and size of effect among the 
regions. Specifically, while marital dissolution is positively related to suicide rates in 
most regions, the variation in the magnitude of effect is rather wide (Figure 1.1a). 
Divorce and separation are not associated with suicide risk among English-speaking 
countries; in contrast, the association is significant, yet modest, in Latin America and 
Northern Europe, and it is the strongest in Southern Europe and East Asia. Further, 
parenthood is also unequally protective against suicide across regions (Figure 1.1b). 
Although having more children is strongly related to lower suicide rates in Latin America, 
English-speaking countries, and Northern Europe, this relationship is much weaker in 
Western Europe, Southern Europe, and East Asia. In addition, co-residence with parents 
is more strongly related to lower suicide risk in East Asia and Southern, Eastern, and 
Western Europe than in Northern Europe, Latin America, and English-speaking countries 
(Figure 1.1c).  
Moreover, the effects of religious participation on suicide risk also vary 
significantly across regions (Figure 1.1d). Frequent attendance at religious services shows 
much stronger protective effects in Latin America than in any other regions. In contrast, 
involvement in religious activities does not seem protective in Western Europe and East 
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Asia; unexpectedly, it is associated with a higher risk of suicide. Finally, general social 
trust is related to lower suicide rates in Western and Southern Europe but not in other 
regions (Figure 1.1e); however, the cross-regional variation is less conspicuous compared 
to other social relationships. 
 In addition to the varying effects of social cohesion on suicide across regions, the 
random-slope models also suggest that most of the cross-regional variation in suicide 
rates is not driven by the level of social cohesion (Hypothesis III). Only number of 
children, frequency of religious participation, and level of trust explain some of the 
differences in suicide risk. Specifically, the gap in suicide rates between East Asia and 
Latin America is attenuated when number of children or religious participation is 
included in the analysis (this is shown by comparing Model 3 and Model 5, respectively, 
with Model 1 in Table 1.4). Also, the suicide gap between East Asia and Northern Europe 
turns insignificant when general social trust is taken into account (this is demonstrated by 
comparing Model 6 with Model 1). However, disparities in suicide rates between other 
regions are barely explained by any indicators of social cohesion. In fact, marital 
dissolution and co-residence with parents suppress, rather than explain, the suicide gaps 
between East Asia and Western Europe and between East Asia and Northern Europe 
(shown by comparing Model 2 and Model 4, respectively, with Model 1). This suggests 
that the cross-regional differences in suicide rates would be even larger when percentage 
of divorce/separation or percentage of co-residence with parents is held constant. 
Likewise, number of children and religious participation also suppress the suicide gap 
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between East Asia and Northern Europe (shown by comparing Model 3 and Model 5, 
respectively, with Model 1).  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Since suicide deaths are likely to be undercounted non-randomly (e.g., the extent of 
undercounting varies across social contexts), official suicide statistics may be artifacts 
lacking the value of theorization and policy implications. In particular, findings based on 
official rates may not correctly identify protective or risk factors for suicide. To address 
this concern, I consider deaths of three other causes—injury with undetermined intent, 
unintentional poisoning, and unintentional drowning—that likely include the most 
misclassified or hidden suicide cases. I re-estimate the multilevel regression models using 
“adjusted” suicide rates, which consist of the original suicide rates (reported by the WHO) 
and the death rates of injury with undetermined intent, unintentional poisoning, and 
unintentional drowning. 
 Table 1.5 shows the components of the “adjusted” suicide rates by region. Like 
suicide rates, death rates of injury with undetermined intent, unintentional poisoning, and 
unintentional drowning also vary across regions. Extremely high death rates of these 
three causes may signal underreports or misclassified cases of suicide deaths. Specifically, 
Latin America has exceptionally high death rates of injury with undetermined intent (13 
deaths per 100,000) in contrast to all the other regions (ranging from 2 to 5 deaths per 
100,000). In addition, Northern and Eastern Europe have relatively high death rates of 
unintentional poisoning, and East Asia and Eastern Europe show relatively high death 
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rates of unintentional drowning. Assuming that all deaths from the three causes are 
actually suicide cases (the worst scenario of suicide underreport), the regional ranking of 
the “adjusted” suicide rates is somewhat different from the ranking of the original suicide 
rates. The most notable difference is that Latin America no longer has the lowest level of 
suicide risk; its “adjusted” suicide rates are higher than those in English-speaking 
countries and Southern Europe. Another minor difference is that Northern Europe and 
Western Europe switch their ranks after the adjustment. 
  There are some changes in the results of multilevel regression models when the 
“adjusted” suicide rates are used. Nevertheless, most of these changes are moderate and 
do not overturn the original findings. Specifically, the marginal effects of divorce and 
separation maintain similar size and regional ranking as before, except that Latin 
America and Northern Europe switch their ranks (Figure 1.2a). Regarding parenthood, its 
marginal effects on suicide rates are attenuated, particularly for Latin America. The ranks 
also switch between Latin America and English-speaking countries and between 
Southern and Eastern Europe (Figures 1.2b). Moreover, the marginal effects of religious 
participation are attenuated, particularly for Latin America; however, the regional ranking 
remains the same (Figures 1.2d). In addition, the marginal effects of trust also maintain 
similar size and ranking except that East Asia and Southern Europe switch their ranks 
(Figures 1.2e). Finally, the regional pattern for the marginal effects of co-residence with 
parents is very similar as before (Figures 1.2c). 
Overall, when suicide rates are considered together with the death rates of injury 
with undetermined intent, unintentional poisoning, and unintentional drowning, the 
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association between social cohesion and suicide only changes moderately. Indeed, the 
changes are mostly modest attenuation of the size of the effects and sometime involve 
rank switching between a couple of regions. Among all the regions, Latin America shows 
the most significant change when the “adjusted” rates are applied, particularly regarding 
the effects of religious participation and number of children. These shifts in Latin 
America may reflect its exceptionally high death rates of injury with undetermined intent, 
which possibly mask some misclassified suicide cases. Nevertheless, the changes found 
in the sensitivity analysis do not alter the major conclusion that the association between 
social relationships and suicide risk varies significantly across regions of the world.  
 
Discussion 
This study assesses the relationship between social cohesion and suicide from a 
comparative perspective. As Durkheim’s theory predicts, cohesive social relationships, 
including lower rates of marital dissolution and higher rates of parenthood, co-residence 
with parents, religious participation, and social trust are generally associated with lower 
risk of suicide. However, when stratifying the analysis by region, the study shows that the 
link between social cohesion and suicide varies significantly across contexts. In particular, 
findings from the multilevel random-slope models indicate that cohesive relationships are 
not always protective against suicide: the magnitude and, occasionally, the direction of 
the effects of social relationships differ from region to region.  
The regional variation in the effects of social cohesion reflects the diversity of 
institutional and cultural practices. Specifically, divorce and separation strongly predict 
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higher suicide mortality in East Asia and Southern Europe. In contrast, marital 
dissolution has much weaker effects on suicide risk in Northern Europe and Latin 
America, and it even shows no deleterious effects among English-speaking countries. 
This regional pattern suggests that where marital dissolution is less common, such as in 
East Asia and Southern Europe (Table 1.1), it may encourage suicide attempts more. 
However, in places where stigma against divorce and unconventional family types (e.g., 
cohabitation and single parent family) is relatively weak, such as Northern Europe, Latin 
America, and English-speaking countries (Esteve, García-Román, and Lesthaeghe 2012; 
Esteve, Lesthaeghe, and López-Gay 2012; Lesthaeghe 2010; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 
2006), marital dissolution does not exert the same level of positive effects on suicide risk. 
The regional pattern is consistent with previous findings that the gap in suicide mortality 
between divorced and married individuals is smaller when divorce is more socially 
accepted and prevalent (Pampel 1998; Stack 1990).   
Likewise, parenthood strongly predicts lower suicide risk in Latin America, 
English-speaking countries, and Northern Europe; in contrast, the protective effects are 
much weaker in East Asia, Southern Europe, and Western Europe. The findings reflect 
that costs of parenting and institutional efforts for alleviating childrearing burdens vary 
across contexts. There are three relevant aspects: welfare state regime, the compatibility 
of childrearing and labor force participation, and the availability of day care for children. 
Specifically, Northern European countries are characterized by their strong public 
support for childcare such as tax allowances and direct transfers (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Esping-Andersen 1999). Anglophone countries, while many of them being classified as 
 

21
the liberal (means-tested) welfare regime, have relatively flexible labor market that 
accommodates the needs of women with young children, including opportunities to rejoin 
labor market after a childbirth and to work part-time (Diprete et al. 2003; Kohler, Billari, 
and Ortega 2006; Morgan 2003). Also, day care services are more widely available 
through private agencies in English-speaking countries (Rindfuss, Guzzo, and Morgan 
2003). In contrast, countries in East Asia and Southern and Western Europe not only lack 
sufficient state support for childcare, but their labor market is also less friendly to women 
with children (Aspalter 2006; Holliday 2000; Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2006). Besides, 
childcare mostly relies on family networks in part because private day care services are 
not widely accessible and the use of them is more often considered unfavorable to 
children (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2006; Rindfuss, Brewster, and Kavee 1996). 
Accordingly, parenting is related to extra financial, time, and career costs that may cancel 
out the benefits of raising children in these regions. Overall, the regional pattern of 
parenthood and suicide risk corresponds to Margolis and Myrskylä's (2011) argument 
that the relationship between fertility and unhappiness below age 40 is the strongest in 
countries with low public support for family. Parenting stress due to the lack of 
institutional support reflects not only on the lowest low fertility in East Asia and Southern 
Europe (notably including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Italy, and Spain), but also on the 
diminished beneficial effects of parenthood on mental well-being in the regions.   
Further, there is also regional variation in the relationship between co-residence 
with parents and suicide. In particular, living with parents is significantly related to lower 
risk of suicide in East Asia and Southern, Eastern, and Western Europe; however, the 
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association turns weaker in Northern Europe and becomes insignificant in Latin America 
and English-speaking countries. The regional differences reflect economic insecurity 
among young adults, welfare state regime, as well as cultural expectation of 
intergenerational support. Specifically, among young adults in Eastern and Southern 
Europe and some countries in East Asia and Western Europe (e.g., Japan and France), 
high unemployment and economic insecurity due to market transition, economic 
stagnation, and/or industrial restructuring have been nation-wide concerns since the 90s 
(Kingston 2011; Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2006; Szikra and Tomka 2009). Delayed 
home leaving or transition out of parental home may buffer the impact of economic stress 
on young adults and thus reduce their suicide risk. Moreover, for middle-aged adults in 
places of limited public support for elderly care and child care, such as East Asia and 
Southern Europe, the tradition of intergenerational transfers, facilitated by co-residence, 
may reduce their suicide risk (Aspalter 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Szikra and 
Tomka 2009). On the one hand, the sense of responsibility to take care of elderly parents 
may discourage suicide ideation and attempt; this cultural expectation could be reinforced 
when state intervention in elderly care is weak. On the other hand, financial or in-kind 
transfers from elderly parents to adult children may also help relieve the stress of child 
rearing and therefore reduce suicide risk. Downward transfers are especially needed when 
state does not provide sufficient support for childrearing.  
In addition, the association between religious participation and suicide rates varies 
significantly across world regions. It is strongly negative in Latin America and 
moderately negative in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Europe and English-speaking 
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countries; surprisingly, the association is positive in East Asia and Western Europe. This 
wide variation in the effects of religious participation can be attributed to the strength of 
religious networks or the availability of integrated religious communities (Ellison, Burr, 
and McCall 1997; Pescosolido 1990; Pescosolido and Georgianna 1989; Wray, Colen, 
and Pescosolido 2011). In particular, the strength of religious networks may depend on 
the authority of religious institutions, the level of religiosity, and the ways in which 
religious practices are organized. In some regions of Christian tradition, the declining 
authority of religious institutions and clergy and the individualized pursuit of spirituality 
(e.g., the New Age spirituality movements that encourage practices of channeling, 
meditation therapy, and astrology) have undermined religious networks and communities 
(Norris and Inglehart 2011). Specifically, the decline of religiosity and participation in 
religious services is the most significant in many Catholic countries in Western and 
Southern Europe, including Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. As 
the World Values Survey measures confidence in church (as an indicator of the status and 
authority of church) and level of religiosity, I conduct additional analyses to test whether 
these two factors explain the weak protective effects of religious participation in Southern 
Europe and the anomaly positive effects in Western Europe. Figure 1.3 shows that when 
confidence in church is controlled for, the protective effects of religious participation on 
suicide becomes stronger in Southern Europe, and the deleterious effects of religious 
participation in Western Europe are reversed. Likewise, when level of religiosity is taken 
into account, the deleterious effects of religious participation in Western Europe are 
reversed again (Figure 1.4). The evidence suggests that less integrated religious 
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communities in Western and Southern Europe, indicated by low confidence in church and 
religiosity, may be responsible for the lack of benefits of religious participation in the 
regions. 
Moreover, how religious practices are usually organized—whether the practices 
tend to be individual or collective—may explain the deleterious effects of religious 
participation in East Asia. Specifically, religious beliefs in East Asia such as Buddhism, 
Confucianism, Taoism, and Shinto differ from Christianity in the notion of congregations 
(Norris and Inglehart 2011). Individual practices including prayer, meditation, and 
ancestor worship are considered equally or more important than collective services. 
Therefore, religious networks in East Asia may be less integrated and less effective in 
suicide prevention. Finally, suicide behavior is not sanctioned in East Asian faiths as 
much as in Christianity. Traditionally, Asian religions do not necessarily see suicide as 
evil: while it is not encouraged, it is morally acceptable in certain circumstances 
(Wasserman and Wasserman 2009). For example, suicide is justified in Confucianism 
and Shinto when it is committed for integrity, loyalty, and patriotism. This could be 
another reason why religious participation is linked to higher suicide rates in East Asia. 
In addition to the varying effects of social cohesion on suicide, the study also 
finds that levels of social cohesion do not explain most of the suicide gaps between 
regions. Only number of children and frequency of religious participation may drive part 
of the suicide difference between East Asia and Latin America, and level of social trust 
explains the suicide gap between East Asia and Northern Europe. However, all other 
cross-regional differences in suicide rates remain significant when levels of social 
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cohesion are held constant. These results imply that as the protective types of social 
relationships differ from region to region, the amount of social resources from any 
specific type of relationship would not be a major factor in the suicide gap between 
regions.  
Several limitations of the current study should be acknowledged. First, by 
focusing on between-region variation, the study ignores the between-country differences 
in suicide risk, social relationships, and institutional and cultural settings within a region. 
Although the between-region variation in suicide mortality accounts for almost 70% of 
the between-country variation, future research will benefit from exploring the 
unexplained proportion of the between-country variation when more observations for 
each country are available. Moreover, the study uses data of aggregate variables, with 
age-gender-country groups as the lowest unit of analysis. Therefore, the risk of making 
an ecological fallacy should be recognized. In particular, ecological fallacy refers to that 
correlations between two variables at the aggregate level may differ from the correlations 
between the same variables at the individual level (Robinson 2009). Since the current 
study uses aggregated data to demonstrate the association between social environment 
and suicide across world regions, results cannot be used to make inferences about 
cohesive social relationships and suicide risk for individuals. Finally, the official suicide 
statistics may suffer from non-random misclassification and underreport of suicide deaths. 
Specifically, the extent to which suicide mortality is underestimated may vary across 
social contexts, leading to a false conclusion of comparative suicide research. However, 
the sensitivity analysis in this study shows that findings regarding the relationship 
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between social cohesion and suicide across regions remain quite similar when the 
“adjusted” suicide rates are applied. Although suicide rates may be more likely to be 
underreported in certain regions, particularly Latin America, the potential underreports do 
not revise the conclusion that social relationships are linked to suicide risk in different 
ways between regions of the world. This finding is consistent with the argument by 
Pescosolido and Mendelsohn (1986) that misreporting in official suicide statistics has 
little impact on the effects of variables that are commonly used to test sociological 
theories of suicide. 
In conclusion, the study challenges the simplicity of Durkheim’s theory on social 
cohesion and suicide by showing that the benefits of cohesive relationships vary by 
context. Findings imply that instituitional and cultural factors, including stigma of marital 
dissolution, state welfare policy, strength of religious networks, and expectation of 
intergenerational transfers, may shape the protectiveness of social relationships. Broadly, 
people in East Asia, Southern Europe, and Western Europe benefit more from intact 
marital relationship and co-residence with parents. By contrast, people in English-
speaking countries, Latin America, and Northern Europe may find parenting and 
religious participation more rewarding. Meanwhile, people in Eastern Europe modestly 
benefit from all types of cohesive relationships except social trust. Accordingly, the study 
suggests that there is no universal strategy for suicide prevention and that interventions 
should accommodate local norms, values, and institutional practices.  
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of suicide rates and social relationships by region  
  Range Overall 
East 
Asia 
English- 
speaking 
Latin 
America
Northern 
Europe 
Western 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe
Suicide rates (per 100,000) 0.4-176.9 19.1 25.6 14.3 9.6 21.5 23.4 15.4 27.7 
% Being currently divorced or separated 0-100 5.4 2.4 6.7 6.8 8.2 5.8 3.0 4.7 
Number of children 0-6.5 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 
% Living with parents 0-100 20.0 31.2 14.9 23.5 8.4 14.2 25.3 20.9 
% Attending religious services at least once a 
month 0-100 38.5 22.6 46.3 55.8 12.7 29.6 39.4 40.7 
% Reporting most people can be trusted 0-100 31.0 33.8 43.3 17.7 62.0 33.7 25.4 21.4 
N  --- 1,687 125 238 307 166 210 292 349 
Note: The range refers to the minimum and maximum possible values at the level of age-gender-country group. All the variables differ across regions at the 1% significance 
level according to the non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test. 
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Table 1.2: OLS linear regression of logged suicide rates on social relationships 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Region (Ref: East Asia)               
English-speaking countries -0.581** -0.599** -0.517** -0.667** -0.443** -0.537** -0.421** 
(0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.054) 
Latin America -1.132** -1.158** -0.982** -1.190** -0.892** -1.199** -0.952** 
(0.067) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.068) (0.072) 
Northern Europe -0.172** -0.196** -0.242** -0.333** -0.239** -0.036 -0.214** 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.058) (0.062) (0.059) (0.069) (0.069) 
Western Europe -0.208** -0.217** -0.258** -0.307** -0.166** -0.223** -0.330** 
(0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) 
Southern Europe -1.000** -0.998** -1.050** -1.030** -0.847** -1.043** -1.018** 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.058) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058) 
Eastern Europe -0.001 -0.014 -0.116+ -0.068 0.108+ -0.046 -0.140* 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063) 
% Divorced or separated 0.006+ -0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Number of children -0.273** -0.236** 
(0.024) (0.024) 
% Living with parents -0.009** -0.008** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
% Attending religious services at least once a month     -0.007**  -0.005** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
% Reporting most people can be trusted      -0.005** -0.008** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 1.819** 1.864** 1.519** 2.376** 1.743** 1.854** 2.045** 
(0.071) (0.075) (0.073) (0.099) (0.069) (0.071) (0.099) 
R-squared 0.724 0.724 0.743 0.734 0.739 0.726 0.765 
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. All the models control for age, sex, time trend, ICD version, and GDP per capita. 
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Table 1.3: Standard deviations of the marginal effects of social relationships across regions (multilevel random-slope models) 
Variable S.D. Estimate S.E. p value 
% Being currently divorced or separated 0.010 0.003 <0.001 
Number of children 0.152 0.043 <0.001 
% Living with parents 0.005 0.001 <0.001 
% Attending religious services at least once a month 0.011 0.004 0.002 
% Reporting most people can be trusted 0.006 0.002 0.004 
 
 
Table 1.4: Cross-regional suicide gaps by model of social cohesion (in logged suicide rates)  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Region (Ref: East Asia) Basic Basic + Marital dissolution 
Basic + 
Number of 
children 
Basic + 
Coresidence with 
parents 
Basic + 
Religious 
participation 
Basic + Trust
English-speaking countries -0.581** -0.624** -0.504** -0.633** -0.583** -0.569** 
(0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048) (0.061) 
Latin America -1.132** -1.176** -0.878** -1.231** -0.650** -1.113** 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.062) (0.065) (0.069) (0.074) 
Northern Europe -0.172** -0.249** -0.257** -0.325** -0.552** -0.169 
(0.060) (0.058) (0.057) (0.067) (0.123) (0.114) 
Western Europe -0.208** -0.280** -0.206** -0.341** -0.202** -0.201** 
(0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) 
Southern Europe -1.000** -1.033** -0.990** -1.039** -1.055** -1.064** 
(0.059) (0.057) (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) 
Eastern Europe -0.001 -0.058 -0.036 -0.079 -0.087 -0.037 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.068) 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. All the models use multilevel linear regression with random-slope specification, controlling for age, 
sex, time trend, the ICD version, and GDP per capita. 
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Table 1.5: Components of the "adjusted" suicide rates (deaths per 100,000) 
  Overall East Asia
English- 
speaking 
Latin 
America
Northern 
Europe 
Western 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Suicide rates 19.1 25.6 14.3 9.6 21.5 23.4 15.4 27.7 
Death rates of injury with undetermined intent 5.3 4.4 2.1 13.3 3.2 2.8 2.5 5.6 
Death rates of unintentional poisoning  3.2 1.5 2.4 1.0 6.9 1.2 2.0 6.6 
Death rates of unintentional drowning 2.7 4.4 1.5 2.9 2.0 1.1 2.1 4.3 
"Adjusted" suicide rates (suicide rates + death rates of injury with 
undetermined intent, unintentional poisoning, and unintentional 
drowning) 
30.2 35.9 20.2 26.9 33.6 28.5 22.0 44.2 
N  1,687 125 238 307 166 210 292 349 
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Figure 1.1: Marginal effects of social relationships on logged suicide rates 
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Figure 1.1 continued: Marginal effects of social relationships on logged suicide rates 
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Figure 1.1 continued: Marginal effects of social relationships on logged suicide rates 
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Figure 1.2: Marginal effects of social relationships on logged “adjusted” suicide rates 
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Figure 1.2 continued: Marginal effects of social relationships on logged “adjusted” suicide rates 
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Figure 1.2 continued: Marginal effects of social relationships on logged “adjusted” suicide rates 
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Figure 1.3: Marginal effects of religious participation with or without confidence in church as a control variable 
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Figure 1.4: Marginal effects of religious participation with or without level of religiosity as a control variable 
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Appendix 
Table A1.1: Number of World Values Surveys participated by sample countries 
  Wave of the World Values Survey   
Country 1981-1984 1989-1993 1994-1998 1999-2004 2005-2007
Total number of 
surveys participated by 
each country  
Argentina 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Australia 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Austria 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Belgium 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Brazil 0 1 1 0 1 3 
Bulgaria 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Canada 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Chile 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Colombia 0 0 2 0 0 2 
Croatia 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Czech 0 2 1 1 0 4 
Denmark 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Finland 0 1 1 1 1 4 
France 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Germany 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Greece 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Hungary 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Ireland 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Italy 1 1 0 1 1 4 
Japan 0 1 1 1 1 4 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Macedonia 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Mexico 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Moldova 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Netherlands 1 1 0 1 0 3 
New Zealand 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Norway 0 1 1 0 1 3 
Peru 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Poland 0 2 1 1 1 5 
Portugal 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Romania 0 0 1 1 1 3 
Singapore 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Slovakia 0 1 1 1 0 3 
Slovenia 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Spain 1 1 1 2 1 6 
Sweden 0 1 1 1 1 4 
Taiwan 0 0 1 0 1 2 
UK 1 1 0 1 0 3 
Uruguay 0 0 1 0 1 2 
US 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Venezuela 0 0 1 1 0 2 
Total number of 
surveys in each 
wave  
9 28 29 34 22 122 
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CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC SECURITY, SOCIAL COHESION, AND MENTAL 
HEALTH DISPARITIES IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARISON 
OF OLDER ADULTS IN CHINA AND RUSSIA 
 
Introduction 
Mental and substance use disorders are major contributors to the global burden of disease, 
accounting for the largest share (23%) of years lived with disability worldwide as of 2010 
(Whiteford et al. 2013). Depression, in particular, is a common mental illness and the 
leading cause of disability. Depressive symptoms are prevalent among older adults partly 
due to decline in physical and cognitive health, transition out of social roles (e.g., 
retirement and widowhood), and shrinkage of social networks (Ross and Mirowsky 2008; 
Yang 2007). Moreover, the burden of mental and substance use disorders increasingly 
affects people in less developed countries because of the scarcity, the inequitable 
distribution, and the inefficient use of mental health resources (Knapp et al. 2006; Saxena 
et al. 2007). For instance, low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) on average spend 
less than 2% of their entire health budgets on mental health. As the disease burden is 
predicted to rise in the foreseeable future, the lack of evidence-based research on mental 
health in LMIC will become a major obstacle to policy formulation and health 
intervention (Sharan et al. 2007; Whiteford et al. 2013).  
 Using data from the WHO Study on Global Ageing and Adult Health, this study 
examines the prevalence and severity of depressive symptoms among older adults in two 
middle-income countries, China and Russia. While these two countries have both gone 
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through drastic social changes due to market reform since 1978 and 1991, respectively, 
only the population of Russia has experienced severe deterioration in mental and physical 
health after its structural adjustment, including increased mortality rates attributable to 
suicide, alcohol consumption, and cardiovascular diseases and consequently shortened 
life expectancies (Cockerham 2007; Shkolnikov et al. 1998). In contrast, China has made 
steady progress in various dimensions of population health (Liu, Rao, and Fei 1998). 
Further, although the general health condition in Russia has gradually recovered to its 
pre-transition level in the late 2000s, the current health disparity between China and 
Russia, indicated by their life expectancies, is still large (Figure 1). In particular, the 
disease burden attributable to mental and substance use disorders is significantly higher 
in Russia than in China according to the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk 
Factors Study 2010 (Whiteford 2013)5.  
 As previous studies have shown, market transition weakens individuals’ economic 
security based on guaranteed employment and benefits such as housing, health care, and 
pension (Carlson 2004; Haggard and Kaufman 2008). Meanwhile, market transition also 
disrupts social cohesion including trust and sense of community due to elevated 
uncertainty and competition over economic resources (Kennedy, Kawachi, and Brainerd 
1998; Latusek and Cook 2012; Shlapentokh 2006). Since economic and social resources 
are both critical determinants of health and well-being (Berkman and Glass 2000; House, 
Landis, and Umberson 1988; Marmot and Wilkinson 2006), this study aims to investigate 
how these two factors are linked to depression in contemporary China and Russia and 

5 Russia is among the countries with the highest age-standardized DALY rate per 100,000 individuals, and 
China is among the countries with the lowest age-standardized DALY rate. DALY refers to disability-
adjusted life year. 
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whether the levels of economic security and social cohesion explain the wide disparity in 
depression between these two settings. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I will first discuss previous findings 
concerning the importance of economic conditions and social resources in mental health, 
with special attention given to societies in transition. This discussion will lead to the 
hypotheses of the current study. Then I will describe the data, variables, and methods 
used for the empirical analyses. Finally, I will present the results of bivariate and 
multivariate analyses and discuss their implications and limitations. 
 
Literature Review 
Economic Security and Mental Health 
In general, individuals with lower socioeconomic status experience higher rates of mental 
disorders (Eaton, Muntaner, and Sapag 2010). Specifically, lack of financial resources 
and chronic economic strain are important factors that explain a higher level of perceived 
stress and depressive symptoms, independent of the effects of education and/or 
occupation (Hamad et al. 2008; Pearlin et al. 1981; Skapinakis et al. 2006). Previous 
studies on unemployment and mental well-being have also shown that unemployment 
reduces security and self-esteem and increases depressive symptoms (Lennon and 
Limonic 2010). In particular, deprivation of economic means, along with loss of social 
connection and identity, is linked to the detrimental effects of unemployment. Evidence 
based on longitudinal and prospective studies suggests that selection processes (i.e., 
individuals predisposed to mental distress are more likely to become unemployed) only 
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explain part of the connection between unemployment and mental illness, thereby 
confirming the existence of a causal relationship (Murphy and Athanasou 1999). 
 Poverty has been a major barrier to the enhancement of mental well-being in low- 
and middle-income countries (Patel and Kleinman 2003). Poor living conditions, 
insecurity of maintaining a self-sufficient life, shame of poverty, and illiteracy or poor 
education are all related to elevated rates of mental disorders. The lack of access to 
mental health services further deteriorates the mental well-being of population in a less 
resourceful context (Collins et al. 2011; Knapp et al. 2006; Saxena et al. 2007). 
Specifically, government funding on mental health is far lower than is needed: shortages 
of community-based care, mental health professionals, and effective medications and 
other treatments are very common. In addition, the low priority of mental health in the 
public health agenda—due to under-recognition of the prevalence and impact of mental 
health needs—certainly aggravates the mental health prospect of people in a poorer 
country.  
 Because market transition immediately led to a deep recession in Russia but set 
up sustained economic growth in China, the reform process has severely weakened 
economic stability in Russia rather than in China (Gang 2001; Liu et al. 1998; Popov 
2001). Unemployment and inflation rates rise significantly in post-transition Russia, 
particularly throughout the 90s. Moreover, the post-transition Russian government has 
relatively weak financial capacity to maintain an extensive welfare system, including 
universal health care and pension (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Popov 2001). 
Specifically, health management becomes decentralized and health care is under-funded; 
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supply of health care providers, hospital beds, and medications are unable to meet the 
needs (Liu et al. 1998; Tulchinsky and Varavikova 1996). Overall, living standards for 
the majority of Russians have severely deteriorated since the market reform in the early 
90s, which is followed by another economic crisis in the late 90s. Studies have indicated 
that stress from economic turmoil has impaired the mental and physical health of the 
Russian population (Carlson 2004; Cockerham, Hinote, and Abbott 2006).   
 
Social Cohesion and Mental health 
A large body of research has shown that social bonds and supportive relationships are 
associated with better mental health outcomes (Berkman and Glass 2000; House et al. 
1988; Lin, Ye, and Ensel 1999; Turner and Brown 2010). Specifically, cohesive social 
relationships promote mental health through providing individuals with instrumental, 
emotional, and informational assistance. Since support from social ties helps individuals 
cope with crises and adapt to major life transitions, it may be particularly beneficial in 
stressful circumstances (Cassel 1976; Cobb 1976). In addition, cohesive relationships 
foster a sense of meaning and belonging and facilitate health-promoting behaviors such 
as regular exercise, healthy diet, and limited consumption of tobacco and alcohol.  
 Because societies in transition usually experience drastic socioeconomic and/or 
political transformation, social cohesion can be severely disrupted and thus the mental 
health of individuals can be compromised during the transition (Minagawa 2013; Rose 
2000). As Durkheim's (1897) theory on anomie has indicated, structural change of a 
society undermines social integration and social regulation that constrain individuals’ 
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deviant behavior and thus prevent the occurrence of failure, frustration, and despair. 
Other research in transitional settings has also suggested that new challenges to the 
development of a civic society emerge right after the collapse of a repressive socialist 
regime. In countries of former Soviet Union, institutional capacities including 
enforcement of the rule of law, delivery of public goods such as health care and social 
security, and control of consumer prices all significantly declined during the 
transformation (Popov 2001). This was closely followed by the loss of trust in public 
institutions and a growing sense of alienation from political power among civilians 
(Cornia and Popov 2001; Raiser et al. 2002; Shlapentokh 2006). In particular, trust in 
bureaucracy, law enforcement agencies, and “democratic” institutions are extremely low 
in contemporary Russia. Although trust among family and close friends may remain high, 
trust in institutions, communities, and strangers is generally low in Russia (Freitag and 
Traunmüller 2009; Latusek and Cook 2012). Finally, even if the number of non-
governmental organizations has grown in Russia since the fall of Soviet Union, 
participation rates in such organizations remain low (Ferlander and Mäkinen 2009). 
 In China, trust in public institutions is much higher in part because the transition 
takes a slower pace, the economic boom raises standards of living, and the communist 
government carefully controls the social and political order (Steinhardt 2012; Tan and 
Tambyah 2011). However, the market reform has also brought a more fragmented society. 
Specifically, the privatization or bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises has changed 
individuals’ relationship with the state and their work communities (Ruan et al. 1997). 
Individuals nowadays shoulder more responsibilities of their basic needs including 
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housing, medical care, and education, which used to be state-sponsored. Concomitant 
with the de-collectivized institutions is a moral change: pursuit of personal desires is no 
longer always submissive to group interest for family, neighbors, rural communes or 
urban work units, and the state (Kleinman et al. 2011). In addition, rapid economic 
growth with unequal development between rural and urban areas have encouraged large-
scale internal migration, which alters the living arrangements of migrant families and 
most likely weakens social support from family ties (Lu, Hu, and Treiman 2012).  
 Studies on Russia and China have demonstrated that various indicators of social 
cohesion are associated with health and well-being. In particular, trust, confidence in 
public institutions, membership in organizations, and formal or informal networks that 
individuals can turn to when they need help generally predict better physical and mental 
well-being in Russia (Carlson 2004; D’Hombres et al. 2010; Ferlander and Mäkinen 2009; 
Kennedy et al. 1998; Rose 2000). Similar results have also been found in research on 
East Asian societies, including China (Yamaoka 2008; Yip et al. 2007). However, several 
studies have further indicated that trust is more consistently related to self-rated health, 
mental health, or subjective well-being; in contrast, organizational membership less 
consistently predicts levels of health and well-being (D’Hombres et al. 2010; Yip et al. 
2007). Lastly, although the association between cohesive social relationships and mental 
health is confirmed in Russia and China, respectively, few studies have examined 
whether social cohesion is one of the major factors that explain the mental health 
disparity between these two societies.  
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Hypotheses 
I. Lower levels of economic security among Russians, compared to Chinese, 
partly explain their relatively high levels of depressive symptoms. In 
particular, economic crises in Russia since its market reform have 
significantly reduced the living standards of the Russian majority, causing 
chronic strains and, in turn, poorer mental health. By contrast, the Chinese 
economy has grown steadily and rapidly since its reform, which reflects on 
individuals’ higher satisfaction with their financial situations and thus 
explains their better mental health.  
II. Lower levels of social cohesion experienced by Russians, compared to 
Chinese, also partly explain their relatively high prevalence and severity of 
depression. While market transition has introduced drastic socioeconomic 
and/or political transformation in both societies, social integration and social 
regulation seem to be more disrupted in contemporary Russia. In general, 
Russians have much lower confidence in public institutions and less trust in 
people outside their immediate social circles (i.e., family and close friends), 
which is linked to their poorer mental well-being. 
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
The study uses data from the first wave (2007-2010) of the WHO Study on Global 
AGEing and Adult Health (SAGE). The SAGE drew nationally representative samples of 
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older adults aged 50+ years in six low- and middle-income countries, including China 
and Russia (Kowal et al. 2012).6 Samples were selected using multi-stage random 
sampling with stratification by province/oblast and area (urban/rural). The analytical 
sample includes 12,634 and 3,829 older adults in China and Russia, respectively. Finally, 
the face-to-face interviews conducted by the SAGE survey team have generally high 
response rates: 93% in China and 83% in Russia. 
 
Measures 
Depression is measured by two variables based on self-reported depressive symptoms 
that closely match the diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV). One variable is a 
categorical screening measure, with 0 indicating that during the last 12 months the 
respondent has never had a period lasting several days when he or she either “felt sad, 
empty, or depressed (depressed mood)”, “lost interest in most thing he or she usually 
enjoy (loss of interest)”, or “felt energy decreased or tired all the time (low energy)”, 1 
indicating that the respondent has experienced any of these three symptoms for several 
days, and 2 indicating that the respondent has experienced any of these three symptoms 
nearly everyday for more than 2 weeks. The other variable is a count of 16 depressive 
symptoms during the last 12 months, including depressed mood/loss of interest/low 
energy, experience of depressed mood/loss of interest/low energy for more than 2 weeks, 
experience of depressed mood/loss of interest/low energy most of the day nearly 

6 The SAGE also drew samples of younger adults aged 18-49 years for comparison purposes. However, the 
sample size of younger adults is much smaller, accounting for only about 10% of the entire sample in China 
and Russia. 
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everyday, loss of appetite, slowing down in thinking, slowing down in moving around, 
feeling worried and anxious, feeling restless or jittery, having problems falling asleep, 
waking up too early, having difficulties to concentrate, feeling negative about oneself or 
loss of confidence, feeling hopeless, decrease in interest in sex, thoughts of death, and 
suicide attempts.  
 Several studies suggest that cross-national variation in the levels of mental 
disorders may be attributed to the under-report of mental illness in one country relative to 
another due to unawareness of or reluctance to admit mental illness (Kessler et al. 2007; 
The WHO World Mental Health Survey Consortium 2004). Other studies on health-
reporting styles also argue that the way in which individuals rate their health may differ 
significantly across cultures, with some being more “health-optimistic” than others, 
which partly explains the health differences observed between countries (Grol-
Prokopczyk, Freese, and Hauser 2011; Zimmer et al. 2000). To address this reporting 
bias, I will use anchoring vignettes to test if mental health differences between Chinese 
and Russians are largely attributed to different rating styles. Anchoring vignettes for 
intergroup health comparison are short texts depicting the health conditions of 
hypothetical individuals. Assuming that survey respondents use the same rating standard 
to evaluate the health of hypothetical characters (typically with various levels of health 
and functional abilities) and their own health, anchoring vignettes account for the effects 
of rating styles to reflect the “true” intergroup health difference (For methodological 
details, see Grol-Prokopczyk et al. (2011) and King et al. (2004)). The SAGE asked two 
questions of self-assessed psychological well-being that have corresponding anchoring 
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vignettes: “overall in the last 30 days, how much of a problem did you have with (1) 
feeling sad, low, or depressed and (2) worry or anxiety? (none, mild, moderate, severe, or 
extreme)”. These questions cover two of the symptoms that are used to measure the 
depression variables described earlier, and they have different response categories (5 
instead of 2 categories) and time frame (the last 30 days rather than 12 months). For the 
vignettes used in this study, see the Appendix.  
 Economic security is measured by a standardized scale that includes three 
components regarding household and personal finances: whether the respondent believes 
that his/her household income is enough to cover his/her daily living, how the respondent 
perceives his/her household’s financial situation, and the degree to which the respondent 
reports he/she has enough money to meet his/her own needs (alpha=0.71).  
Social cohesion is measured by a set of variables from the inner to the outer social 
circle, including marital/cohabiting status, whether having a confidant, trust in neighbors 
and coworkers, community participation, perceived safety in one’s residential 
neighborhood, and general social trust. Marital/cohabiting status indicates whether an 
individual is currently married/cohabiting or not. Whether having a confidant indicates 
whether an individual has someone to trust and confide in. Trust in neighbors and 
coworkers is a scale combining two items: trust in people in the respondent’s 
neighborhood and trust in people whom the respondent works with (alpha=0.82). The 
scale is standardized for the convenience of interpretation. Community participation is 
also a standardized scale that indicates the frequency of involvement in community 
activities in the last 12 months. It includes nine items:  attending public meetings in 
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which there was discussion of local or school affairs, meeting personally with a 
community leader, attending any group, club, society, union, or organization meeting, 
working with people in the neighborhood to fix or improve something, having friends 
over to one’s home, being in the home of someone who lives in a different neighborhood, 
socializing with coworkers outside of work, attending religious services (excluding 
weddings and funerals), and getting out to attend social meetings, activities, programs or 
events or to visit relatives or friends (alpha=0.72). Perceived safety is another 
standardized scale that represents two items: how safe from crime and violence does the 
respondent feel when he or she is alone at home and how safe the respondent feels when 
walking down his/her street alone after dark (alpha=0.78). Finally, general social trust 
indicates that an individual believes that most people can be trusted. 
 Control variables include gender and age. According to previous research, women 
tend to have higher rates of mental distress than men, particularly depression and anxiety, 
partly due to greater constraints on personal advancement (e.g., work-family 
tensions)(Mirowsky and Ross 1995). Moreover, age is associated with mental health due 
to life-cycle factors. In particular, levels of depression increase from middle age to old 
age, reflecting widowhood, retirement, deterioration of physical functions, and other 
changes in late adulthood (Mirowsky and Ross 2010). 
 
Methods 
I first used bivariate analysis to examine cross-national differences in the levels of 
depression, economic security, and social cohesion. I then adopted ordered logistic 
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regression and negative binomial regression (for the ordinal variable and the count 
variable of depression, respectively) to study whether social cohesion and economic 
security explain country differences in the level of depression. Moreover, I tested whether 
the effects of social cohesion and economic security vary between countries by 
interacting country variable with social cohesion and economic security variables. Finally, 
I conducted a separate analysis using anchoring vignettes to assess the extent to which 
health-rating style accounts for mental health disparities between China and Russia. 
Hierarchical ordinal probit (hopit) regression is used in this analysis (Grol-Prokopczyk et 
al. 2011; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2002). Hopit regression, by rescaling the thresholds 
of standard ordered probit regression, can minimize the effects of rating styles on cross-
national differences in self-rated health.   
 
Results 
Country Differences in Depression, Economic Security, and Social Cohesion 
There are significant country differences in the level of depression, economic security, 
and social cohesion. Table 2.1 shows that Russians are much more depressed than 
Chinese. Specifically, Russians are more likely to feel sad, empty, or depressed 
(depressed mood), to lose interest in most thing they usually enjoy (loss of interest), or to 
feel energy decreased or tired all the time (low energy) for several days or for more than 
two weeks during the past 12 months. They also report a higher number of depressive 
symptoms than Chinese in the past 12 months. These results are consistent with the other 
two indicators of psychological well-being, which are used to assess the effects of health-
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rating styles with anchoring vignettes. In particular, Russians report feeling sad, low, or 
depressed more severely than Chinese in the last 30 days; they also have more problems 
with worry and anxiety in the last 30 days. 
 Moreover, Russians perceive lower levels of economic security than Chinese: 
only 23.6% of Russians report that her/his household income is enough to cover daily 
living; in contrast, 70.6% of Chinese report having enough household income (Table 2.2). 
Likewise, Russians are more likely to report having a bad or very bad household financial 
situation than Chinese. Regarding personal finance, Russians are also more likely to 
report having insufficient amount of money to meet their own needs. Overall, the score 
that summarizes the above three indicators suggests that Russians are significantly less 
satisfied with their household and personal economic situations than Chinese. 
 In addition, various social cohesion indicators demonstrate that Russian society is 
generally less cohesive than Chinese society. First, a smaller proportion of people are 
married or cohabiting in Russia than in China (57.1% versus 83.5%). Further, Russians 
are less likely to report having a confidant or someone to trust and confide in than 
Chinese (78.2% versus 98.2%). Likewise, trust in neighbors and coworkers, perceived 
safety in the neighborhood, and general social trust (belief that most people can be trusted) 
are all significantly lower in Russia than in China. The only exception is that Russians 
report participating in community activities more frequently than Chinese. 
 
Explaining the Cross-National Disparity in Depression 
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According to results from multivariate regression models, the country difference in 
depression is attributable to both economic security and social cohesion. Table 2.3 shows 
that these two factors explain a significant proportion of the different levels of three 
screening symptoms (depressed mood, loss of interest, and low energy) between 
countries. Specifically, the odds of experiencing more severe depressive symptoms are 
4.1 times higher in Russia than in China (Model 1). This mental health disparity in odds 
ratio is reduced to 3.3 times when economic security is taken into account (Model 2). In 
particular, satisfaction with household and personal financial conditions is strongly 
related to a lower level of depression: an increase in economic security by a standard 
deviation is related to a decrease in the odds of depression by 37% (odds ratio=0.63). The 
effects of economic security explain about 20% of the country difference in depression. 
Furthermore, when the social cohesion indicators are considered, the mental health 
disparity between Russia and China also narrows: the odds ratio is reduced from 4.1 to 
2.9 (Model 3). This demonstrates that social cohesion explains about 30% of the country 
difference in depression. Finally, the joint effects of economic security and social 
cohesion are responsible for about 40% of the depression gap between countries (Model 
4).  
 A similar pattern is found in the analysis of the count of depressive symptoms 
(Table 2.4). All the economic security and social cohesion variables are negatively 
associated with number of depressive symptoms. In particular, economic security and 
marital/cohabiting status have the strongest negative relationship with depression. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the economic security variable reduces the mental health gap 
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between countries from 3.1 to 2.5 (incidence rate ratio), a 19% reduction (Model 2). Also, 
the social cohesion variables together close the depression gap from 3.1 to 2.0 (incidence 
rate ratio), a 35% reduction (Model 3). Lastly, economic security and social cohesion 
jointly reduce the country ratio of the incidence rates from 3.1 to 1.8, explaining 42% of 
the depression disparity between China and Russia (Model 4). 
 In fact, the role of economic security and social cohesion in the cross-national 
depression gap is not only attributed to the lower level of economic and social resources 
in Russia relative to China, but also to the weaker effects of economic and social 
resources in Russia than in China. Table 2.5 demonstrates that an increase in the 
economic security scale by a standard deviation is related to 43% decrease in the 
incidence rate of depressive symptoms in China, but only 27% decrease in Russia. Also, 
having a confidant and reporting most people can be trusted are both more strongly 
associated with lower incidence rates of depressive symptoms in China compared to 
Russia. Specifically, having a confidant is linked to 52% reduction in the incidence rate 
of depressive symptoms in China, but it has no significant relationship with depression in 
Russia. Similarly, a standard-deviation increase in general social trust is linked to 36% 
reduction in the incidence rate of depressive symptoms in China but, again, no significant 
reduction in Russia. Overall, economic security and social cohesion seem to be less 
beneficial to mental health in Russia than in China. 
  
The Role of Health-Rating Style  
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The lower prevalence and severity of depression among Chinese relative to Russians may 
result from more optimistic health-rating styles in China due to, for example, 
unawareness of mental illness and reluctance to admit mental illness. Anchoring vignettes 
help assess the role of reporting bias in the depression gap between countries. Table 2.6 
shows that health-rating style only contributes to a small proportion of country 
differences in mental well-being. In particular, Russians are more likely to report feeling 
sad, low, or depressed than Chinese in the past 30 days regardless of health-rating styles. 
This gap remains significant in the hopit model, where rating styles are taken into 
account using anchoring vignettes. In comparison to the ordered probit model (rating 
styles are unadjusted), the magnitude of the depression gap is attenuated by only 15%. 
Likewise, Russians report more worry and anxiety than Chinese in the past 30 days. 
However, this cross-national gap is barely explained by the way in which people rate 
their mental well-being: the magnitude of the worry/anxiety gap decreases by just 5% 
after health-rating style is adjusted). As a result, a more optimistic health-reporting 
fashion is unlikely to be a major factor in the higher levels of mental health reported by 
Chinese relative to Russians. 
 
Discussion 
Mental and substance use disorders, particularly depression, are the leading causes of 
disability worldwide. The disease burden is predicted to affect individuals in low- and 
middle-income countries more severely over time in part because of their insufficient 
access to and inefficient use of mental health resources. The current study examines 
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depression among adults aged 50 and above in two emerging societies, China and Russia, 
focusing on the roles of economic security and social cohesion in their mental health 
disparity. The study shows that, while these two countries have both recently gone 
through drastic social and economic transformation due to market reform, people in 
China are significantly less depressed than their counterparts in Russia. In particular, the 
significant lower levels of depressive symptoms among Chinese is in part attributed to 
their higher satisfaction with personal and household finances and their more cohesive 
social relationships. Moreover, using anchoring vignettes, the study demonstrates that 
being more or less health-optimistic only contributes to a small proportion of the cross-
national difference in mental well-being.   
 These findings have several implications. First, market transition has led to 
divergent trajectories of economic development in China and Russia, creating different 
levels of economic security and, in turn, mental health disparities. Specifically, in 
contrast to China’s sustained growth since its market reform, the post-transition Russia 
has been struck by several severe recessions, throughout the early 90s, in 1998, and again 
in 2009, according to the World Development Indicators. The relatively unstable 
economy reflects on the lower level of economic security perceived by contemporary 
Russians. Previous studies have further suggested that the magnitude of the restructuring 
recession in Russia is partly due to its over-industrialization on the eve of the market 
reform: heavy investment in capital-intensive industries (e.g., machinery and defense) at 
the expense of the service sector (e.g., trade and financial services); in contrast, the 
degree of economic distortion in pre-transition China was much lower because the 
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economy still mostly relied on agriculture (Gang 2001; Popov 2001). At the same time, 
the unfavorable economic environment in Russia have weakened the financial capacity of 
the state, leading to increasingly strained and devalued health care and social security 
systems (Haggard and Kauman 2008). Corresponding to research arguing that economic 
strains impair mental and physical health during market transition (Carlson 2004; 
Cockerham 2006, 2007; Shkolnikov et al. 1998), this study argues that the lack of 
economic security also accounts for the higher levels of depression among Russians 
relative to Chinese in the post-transition era.  
 Further, social cohesion has been more severely disrupted in Russia than in China 
during the transition, which contributes to a higher level of depression in the former than 
the latter. In addition to deep recessions, the structural change in Russia has also 
generated concerns of social disorganization, including poor enforcement of law and 
order, increased crime rates, loss of trust in public institutions, communities, and 
strangers, and a growing sense of alienation from political elites among civilians (Cornia 
and Popov 2001; Freitag 2009; Latusek and Cook 2012; Raiser et al. 2002; Shlapentokh 
2006). Although individualization and fragmentation also face the Chinese society in the 
transitional process, few studies have raised similar concerns about social trust and 
confidence in public institutions in China (Steinhardt 2012; Tan 2011). Moreover, as 
previous research has indicated that cohesive social relationships are linked to better 
mental and physical health in the respective countries (Carlson 2004; D’Hombres 2010; 
Kennedy, Kawachi, and Brainerd 1998; Minagawa 2012; Rose 2000; Yamaoka 2008; 
Yip et al. 2007), this study further demonstrates that difference in social cohesion is an 
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important factor in the between-country depression gap. The findings are consistent with 
Durkheim’s (1897) notion of anomic suicide—large-scale change of the society 
undermines social integration and social regulation that protect individuals from feeling 
detached, frustrated, or despaired.  
 Finally, it is unlikely that a significant proportion of the depression gap between 
China and Russia is attributed to health-rating style. Several studies suggest that mental 
health disparities across countries should be interpreted with great caution because how 
people report their mental well-being is shaped by their awareness of and shame/stigma 
about mental illness (Kessler et al. 2007; The WHO World Mental Health Survey 
Consortium 2004); however, few studies have empirically assessed this argument. Using 
anchoring vignettes, the current study shows that systematic reporting bias plays a minor 
role in the different levels of depressive symptoms between Chinese and Russians. 
Although the data only allow testing for the effect of rating style for two depressive 
symptoms (sad/low/depressed mood and worry/anxiety), the study finds that rating style 
does not explain much of the cross-national variation in either of these symptoms.   
 Several limitations of the current study should be acknowledged. First, since the 
analyses use cross-sectional data, the study cannot make causal interpretations regarding 
the relationship between economic security and depression or between social cohesion 
and depression. In particular, the study cannot rule out the possibility of reverse 
causation—mental distress may weaken an individual’s ability to work and to maintain 
social ties (Chen and Kaplan 2003; House et al. 1988; Wiesner et al. 2003). Further, 
without longitudinal observations dated back to a pre-transition period, the study does not 
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demonstrate that distinct processes of market transition lead to different levels of 
economic and social well-being, which then generate the current mental health gap 
between China and Russia. However, the implications of market transition for the link 
between economic stability, social capital, and health disparities are supported by the 
theory of anomie and empirical evidence since the 1990s (Carlson 2004; Cockerham 
2006; D’Hombres 2010; Ferlander et al. 2009; Liu, Rao, and Fei 1998; Minagawa 2012; 
Rose 2000).  
 Another research limitation is that the models testing the roles of economic 
security and social cohesion and those testing the role of health-rating style in the mental 
health disparity are not integrated. This is because the depression measures in the former 
models differ from the measures of psychological well-being (or the anchoring vignettes) 
in the latter models. Specifically, the depression measures are adapted from the DSM-IV 
diagnostic criteria for the major depressive disorder, including multiple 
aspects/symptoms of depression. In contrast, the measures of psychological well-being 
cover only two of the depressive symptoms, which use a different response categorization 
and time frame. While the study cannot combine these two analyses to evaluate the 
relative importance of economic security and social cohesion versus health-rating style, a 
separate analysis of health-rating style still addresses a fundamental concern of 
comparative health research. That is, mental health disparities by country are not 
significantly driven by artifacts, at least in the context of China and Russia. 
 Despite these limitations, the study fills an important gap in the literature on the 
mental health of populations in emerging societies. As there is a lack of evidence-based 
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research on mental health in low- and middle-income countries, where the burden of 
mental disorders is insufficiently addressed (Sharan et al. 2007; Whiteford 2013), the 
current study examines a common and debilitating mental illness, depression, in two 
transitional countries. Particularly, the study explains the wide disparity in depression 
between China and Russia, both of which have recently experienced market reform. From 
the view of political economy and sociology, the study shows that economic security and 
social cohesion, shaped by the structural transformation, play a significant role in the 
cross-national mental health disparity. The findings suggest that by considering the social, 
economic, and political/historical circumstances of selected countries, future research 
will be able to expand the understanding of global mental health beyond descriptive 
epidemiology of mental illness. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of depressive symptoms by country 
Variable China Russia 
Screening for depression: depressed mood, loss of interest, and low energy 
(%)***   
Having none of the symptoms lasting for several days  85.3 58.0 
Having any of the symptoms lasting for several days  13.4 36.5 
Having any of the symptoms nearly everyday for more   
than 2 weeks  1.3 5.5 
Number of depressive symptoms (0-16)***  
Mean  0.3 1.1 
S.D. 0.0 0.0 
Feeling sad, low, or depressed in the last 30 days***  
None 82.1 59.6 
Mild 14.0 23.6 
Moderate 3.1 12.4 
Severe 0.8 3.9 
Extreme 0.1 0.5 
Worry or anxiety in the last 30 days***  
None 81.8 49.9 
Mild 14.2 31.8 
Moderate 3.3 13.7 
Severe 0.7 4.1 
Extreme 0.0 0.7 
N 12,536  3,821  
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed).    
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of economic security and social cohesion by country 
Variable China Russia 
Economic security 
HH income is enough to cover daily living (%)*** 70.6 23.6 
HH financial situation (%)*** 
Very good 1.2 0.6 
Good 13.7 11.6 
Moderate 62.5 56.6 
Bad 19.9 27.0 
Very bad 2.9 4.4 
Having enough money to meet one's own needs*** 
Completely 13.0 9.9 
Mostly 37.6 27.2 
Moderately 28.7 31.4 
A little 18.3 16.5 
Not at all 2.4 15.0 
Summary score, standardized*** 0.2 -0.3 
Social cohesion 
Married/cohabiting (%)*** 83.5 57.1 
Having a confidant  (%)*** 98.2 78.2 
Trust in neighbors and coworkers (standardized summary score)*** 0.4 -0.5 
Community participation in the past 12 months  (standardized summary score)*** -0.2 0.0 
Perceived safety in the neighborhood (standardized summary score)*** 0.2 -0.8 
Reporting most people can be trusted (%)*** 88.9 29.8 
N 12,536 3,821 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed).    
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Table 2.3: Ordered logit regression of depression screening on economic security and social cohesion (odds ratio) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Russia 4.14** 3.28** 2.90** 2.58** 
(0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) 
Female 1.49** 1.45** 1.33** 1.35** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 1.00* 1.01** 1.00  1.00  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Economic security 0.63** 0.65** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Married/cohabiting 0.69** 0.78** 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Having a confidant 1.08  1.13  
(0.08) (0.09) 
Trust in neighbors and coworkers 0.88** 0.90** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Community participation in the past 12 months 0.91** 0.96+ 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Perceived safety in the neighborhood 0.87** 0.91** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Reporting most people can be trusted 0.92  0.93  
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant (cut 1) 9.62** 10.23** 3.84** 5.84** 
(1.28) (1.39) (0.69) (1.07) 
Constant (cut 2) 121.29** 135.80** 49.50** 78.55** 
  (17.33) (19.71) (9.21) (14.91) 
N 16,357 16,357 16,357 16,357 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed). Standard errors are in parentheses.   
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Table 2.4: Negative binomial regression of number of depressive symptoms on economic security and social cohesion 
(incidence rate ratio) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Russia 3.09** 2.51** 2.02** 1.80** 
(0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) 
Female 1.54** 1.49** 1.35** 1.35** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 1.00* 1.01** 1.00  1.00  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Economic security 0.60** 0.63** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Married/cohabiting 0.75** 0.82** 
(0.04) (0.05) 
Having a confidant  0.84* 0.89  
(0.07) (0.08) 
Trust in neighbors and coworkers 0.92** 0.95* 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Community participation in the past 12 
months   0.83** 0.87** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Perceived safety in the neighborhood 0.81** 0.86** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Reporting most people can be trusted 0.86* 0.83** 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.21** 0.17** 0.63* 0.41** 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.12) (0.08) 
Ln (alpha) 5.64** 4.99** 5.34** 4.83** 
  (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
N 16,357 16,357 16,357 16,357 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed). Standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76
Table 2.5: Effects of social cohesion and economic security on number of depressive symptoms by country (incidence 
rate ratio) 
  China  Russia  Country Difference
Economic security 0.57*** 0.73*** *** 
Married/cohabiting 0.81* 0.85* 
Having a confidant 0.48** 1.04 *** 
Trust in neighbors and coworkers 0.98 0.96 ** 
Community participation in the past 12 months 0.89** 0.87** 
Perceived safety in the neighborhood 0.84** 0.89** ** 
Reporting most people can be trusted 0.64*** 1.11 *** 
Note: Effects are all independent of gender, age, and the rest of the variables in the table. The coefficient estimates are 
in incidence rate ratio and tested against 1 (null effect). Country difference is tested using the interaction term between 
the country variable and a social cohesion or economic security variable.  
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed).    
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Table 2.6: Ordered probit and hopit regressions of psychological well-being on country and demographic variables 
  Ordered probit hopit (Health-rating style is adjusted across countries) 
Feeling sad, low, or depressed Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Russia 0.80*** 0.03 0.68*** 0.07 
Female 0.23*** 0.02 0.22*** 0.05 
Age 0.01*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 
Mother's education (Ref: no school) 
Some/completed primary school -0.13*** 0.03 -0.20** 0.07 
Completed secondary school -0.19*** 0.05 -0.28* 0.12 
Completed high school and more -0.29*** 0.05 -0.26* 0.10 
Worry or anxiety  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Russia  0.96*** 0.03 0.91*** 0.07 
Female 0.25*** 0.02 0.27*** 0.05 
Age 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
Mother's education (Ref: no school) 
Some/completed primary school -0.09** 0.03 -0.09 0.08 
Completed secondary school -0.10* 0.05 -0.14 0.12 
Completed high school and more -0.25*** 0.05 -0.25* 0.11 
Note: Mother's education rather than respondent's education is used to represent socioeconomic status because the Chinese 
sample includes many missing values for the respondent's own education. 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-tailed).    
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Figure 2.1: Life Expectancy at Birth by Country, 1975-2011  
 
Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank 
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Appendix 
The WHO SAGE Anchoring Vignettes for Health State Descriptions 
Introduction Text 
This next section will require additional concentration. I will read to you some stories 
about people with varying levels of difficulties in different areas of health. I want you to think 
about these people’s experiences as if they were your own. Once I have finished reading each 
story, I will ask you to rate what happened in the story. 
I would like to know how you view each story and rate how much of a problem or 
difficulty the person described has in that area of health in the same way that you described your 
own health to me earlier. While giving the rating, think of the person in the story as someone who 
is of your age and background. 
 
Affect Series 
[Wen] feels nervous and anxious. He worries and thinks negatively about the future, but feels 
better in the company of people or when doing something that really interests him. When he is 
alone he tends to feel useless and empty. 
[Manjima] enjoys her work and social activities and is generally satisfied with her life. She gets 
depressed every 3 weeks for a day or two and loses interest in what she usually enjoys but is able 
to carry on with her day to day activities. 
[Lindiwe] feels depressed most of the time. She weeps frequently and feels hopeless about the 
future. She feels that she has become a burden on others and that she would be better dead. 
[Arvind] loves life and is happy all the time. He never worries or gets upset about anything and 
deals with things as they come. 
[Ang] has already had five admissions into the hospital because she has attempted suicide twice 
in the past year and has harmed herself on three other occasions. She is very distressed every day 
for the most part of the day, and sees no hope of things ever getting better. She is thinking of 
trying to end her life again. 
 
These five vignettes about affect, with different levels of mental well-being, are presented to a 
random subsample of the SAGE respondents. After each vignette, respondents were asked the 
following two questions: 
(1) Overall in the last 30 days, how much a problem did [name/he/she] have with 
feeling sad, low, or depressed—none, mild, moderate, severe, or extreme?  
(2) Overall in the last 30 days, how much a problem did [name/he/she] have with 
worry or anxiety—none, mild, moderate, severe, or extreme? 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERPERSONAL NETWORKS IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE: THE CORE DISCUSSION NETWORKS IN CHINA, JAPAN, 
AND THE U.S. 
 
Introduction 
Research has widely acknowledged the significance of interpersonal networks. Through 
providing social support, a sense of belonging, and moral guidance and monitoring, 
interpersonal networks shape and are shaped by a broad range of life domains including 
employment and health and well-being (Berkman and Glass 2000; Bian 1997; Fiori, 
Antonucci, and Cortina 2006; Granovetter 1973; House, Umberson, and Landis 1988; Lin, 
Ye, and Ensel 1999; Umberson, Crosnoe, and Reczek 2010; Wethington and Kessler 
1986). For example, weaker network ties may facilitate job search because they offer 
diverse sources of information beyond that available in one’s social circles (Granovetter 
1973), and stronger network ties may reduce depressive symptoms for their readiness to 
provide intense emotional support (Lin et al. 1999). Analysis of interpersonal networks 
improves our understanding of social environment and gives us insights into individuals’ 
social, economic, physical, and mental well-being. 
 This study examines the structure of core interpersonal networks in three national 
contexts—China, Japan, and the U.S. It analyzes the extent to which broader social 
structure drives cross-national differences in interpersonal networks. In particular, China, 
Japan, and the U.S have very different socio-demographic profiles, including age 
structure, sex ratio, marriage rate, level of education, employment rate, and household 
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size, all of which imply unequal demand for and supply of relational resources and may 
explain the cross-national variation in network structure such as size, kin composition, 
and density. Moreover, results from the study are used to assess whether the cultural 
orientation of social relationships—individualism versus collectivism—shape the 
structure of interpersonal networks as previous studies suggest (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Markus & Schwartz, 2010).  
While research indicates the importance of social context in shaping individuals’ 
personal networks, few studies have empirically tested the hypothesis perhaps because 
comparative data are rarely available. Indeed, the majority of research on social networks 
focuses on a single context, most likely an industrialized setting such as the U.S. In 
addition, among the few comparative works, none have considered the effects of broader 
social and demographic structure on cross-national variation in personal networks. To 
address these gaps in the literature, the current study uses population-level data to: (1) 
demonstrate the diversity of interpersonal networks across national contexts through 
comparing the core discussion networks of urban Chinese, Japanese, and Americans, (2) 
evaluate the role of socio-demographic structure in driving cross-national differences in 
network structure, and (3) assess the conventional cultural stereotypes regarding 
interpersonal relationships, specifically the contrast between Eastern collectivism and 
Western individualism.  
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Core Discussion Networks 
The 1985 General Social Survey (GSS) in the U.S. is the first national survey that studied 
interpersonal networks using standardized instruments (Burt 1984; Marsden 1987). The 
survey asked respondents to name up to five people with whom they discussed important 
matters in the past six months. In addition, respondents provided information about the 
socio-demographic characteristics of each discussion partner, relationship with each 
partner, and whether the partners know one another. With these egocentric questions, 
researchers can construct the so-called core discussion networks, which often include 
strong network ties that individuals use for sociality and advice and for emotional and 
instrumental support (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2006). The 1985 GSS 
shows that Americans had small, kin-centered, relatively dense, and homogeneous 
interpersonal networks (Marsden 1987).  
 Twenty-years later, the 2004 GSS replicated the 1985 GSS network questions to 
assess changes in American discussion networks. The 2004 data show a significant shift 
in the network structure over the two decades. In particular, the average size of discussion 
networks shrank by nearly one person, from three to two confidants; consistently, the 
percentage of people who reported having no confidants to discuss important matters 
increased from 10% to 25% (McPherson et al. 2006). However, the increasing trend of 
social isolation turned out to be highly controversial because of the survey design in 2004 
may induce fatigue and thus underreport of network ties (Fischer 2009). Some studies 
suggest that personal networks in the U.S. have not crumbled since the 1970s as many 
people believe (Fischer 2011). 
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 There are only a few studies on core discussion networks in other societies, most 
of which were published in the 90s. Fischer and Shavit (1995) compared north 
Californian networks with Israeli networks in the Haifa region. They found that networks 
in these two contexts were similar in many aspects, only that the Israeli networks were 
denser than the American networks, which perhaps implies cultural distinction along the 
collectivism-individualism orientation. In addition, Blau, Ruan, and Ardelt (1991) 
compared Chinese networks in Tianjin City of China in 1986 with the 1985 American 
networks. By examining the tendency of homophily, they found that Chinese networks 
are quite similar to American networks with regard to in-group choices 7  and 
heterogeneity of network members. Using the same data, Ruan (1998) further showed 
that Chinese in Tianjin were more likely than contemporary Americans to include 
coworkers in their core discussion networks, which in part reflects that their living 
arrangements and daily needs were closely tied to workplace under the planned economy. 
In the mean time, interpersonal networks in urban China were also under transformation 
due to market reform and the privatization of state enterprises. As indicated by Ruan et al. 
(1997), networks in Tianjin became smaller and part of the family and work ties were 
replaced by friend ties from 1986 to 1993.  
 
A Comparative Perspective: China, Japan, and the U.S. 
Contexts and Social Relations: Looking into the Modern History 
China 

7 In-group choices mean that ego tends to choose people similar to himself/herself as network members. 
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China has been greatly transformed since the market reform starting from 1978. Not only 
is the country, particularly the urban area, harvesting the fruits of rapid economic growth, 
but it is also undergoing concomitant changes in social relationships. For instance, the 
privatization or bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises has weakened the connection 
between urban laborers and their work units. Workplace networks have become less 
important since the market reform because individuals’ basic needs such as housing and 
health care no longer fully or even partially rely on state-sponsored work units (Ruan et 
al. 1997). The de-collectivization has also brought a moral change: expression and pursuit 
of personal interest is no longer always submissive to group interest for family, neighbors, 
and work units or communes (Kleinman et al. 2011). Moreover, the rural-urban disparity 
of economic development has encouraged large-scale internal migration from rural to 
urban areas since the late 70s. Internal migration under the strict hukou system may 
weaken family ties as it often separates migrant workers from their children and elderly 
parents, particularly for rural households (Lu, Hu, and Treiman 2011). Lastly, the one-
child policy, another strategy for economic development enforced since 1979, is partly 
responsible for the shrinkage of family size and population aging (Hesketh, Lu, and Xing 
2005). The policy, together with son preference rooted in the patrilineal/patriarchal 
tradition, has severed sex imbalance and reduced the chance of establishing a family for 
some men. Overall, the Chinese society has become more fragmented and individualized 
in its recent history following the market transition. 
 
Japan 
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Japan has received great influence from multiple cultures along its history. It shares 
Confucian values with China and other Asian societies, which emphasize loyalty, filial 
piety, moderation, and benevolence for communal welfare. Since the Meiji Restoration 
(1868-1912), Japan has also adopted a variety of Western technologies, social customs, 
as well as cultural styles (Tipton 2008). The mixture of foreign cultures with its 
traditional system has given Japan a peculiar position either among other Asian countries 
or among other industrialized economies (Ikeda and Richey 2011). 
 After WWII, Japan reconstituted under the U.S. occupation during 1945-1952. 
The post-war support from the U.S. established the foundation for Japan’s economic 
miracle of sustained GDP growth from 1955 to 1973 (Kingston 2010). Urbanization, the 
expansion of higher education, and female labor force participation that came along with 
the economic development in part contributed to Japan’s family change (Raymo, 
Iwasawa, and Bumpass 2009; Rindfuss et al. 2004). In particular, marriage and 
childbearing were postponed or even foregone while divorce rates were rising, leading to 
a more individualized society. The Lost Decade following the economic bubble burst in 
1989 continued to encourage delayed home-leaving and marriage, meanwhile 
destabilizing families that lost economic security under the recession (Kingston 2010). 
Moreover, in response to the economic stagnation in the 1990s, the Koizumi 
administration (2001-2006) introduced neo-liberal market-oriented reforms, promoting 
deregulation and efficiency and shifting the burdens of risk from the state and employers 
to families and individuals (Ishida and Slater 2009). The neo-liberal policy widened 
income inequality and diminished job security by, for example, replacing lifetime 
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employment with part-time and short-term jobs. This has challenged many Japanese’s 
collective identity and egalitarian mentality that used to maintain social trust and 
reciprocity in the society. Overall, after a century and a half of 
modernization/Westernization, the post-WWII economic miracle, and a long recession in 
the 90s, the Japanese society has become less integrated even if some traditional values 
such as filial piety may still prevail. 
 
United States 
Americans have long been described as unusually individualistic, even when compared 
people in other Western industrialized societies. However, Fischer (2010) argues that 
voluntarism, which has been incubated in the society since the colonial era, is probably a 
more accurate term than radical individualism to describe the prevailing American 
culture. He contends that Americans are not socially disconnected; on the contrary, they 
are quite group-oriented, at least as actively engaged in family, workplace, church, 
neighborhood and other communities as other Westerners. What makes them seem so 
individualistic is actually the freedom of choice to enter and exit any social groups, which 
he calls voluntarism. Throughout the American history, various social circumstances 
have contributed to the strengthening and spread of voluntarism, such as the pursuit of 
individual liberty by settlers, dissident Protestantism, population growth that encouraged 
migration west to new land, and the proliferation of various social groups.  
Further, some studies suggest that the U.S. have experienced the decline of 
community since the second half of the 20th century (Putnam 1995, 2000). Civic 
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participation and other social engagement including joining voluntary organizations, 
voting, signing petitions, and socializing with family, friends, and neighbors, seem to 
take place less and less often. Part of this argument, however, has been contested by other 
research, for example, regarding the downward trend of memberships in associations and 
socializing in the private sphere (Fischer 2005, 2010; Paxton 1999; Wuthnow 2002). The 
critiques generally point out that community involvement changed rather than declined 
during the 20th century. In particular, new types of social groups emerged and gradually 
replaced some of the old ones; longer hours of work redistributed social and emotional 
investment between family members, neighbors, coworkers, and friends; technology 
advancement encouraged networking beyond geographical limitations. In the mean time, 
however, the structure of social networks has also turned looser and less densely-knitted 
when social circles become less nested and individuals can freely come and go (Fischer 
2010; Pescosolido and Rubin 2000; Wellman 2001). Overall, social networks in the 
American society may not be shrinking or collapsing as many have worried, but they are 
likely becoming more fragmented, fragile, and insecure. 
 
Individualism versus Collectivism 
Cross-national comparative research in social science, particularly cross-cultural 
psychology, often argues that social relations are governed by cultural orientations that 
vary across societies (Kitayama & Markus, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Markus & 
Schwartz, 2010). The most commonly discussed and cited cultural orientation is the 
individualism versus collectivism dimension. Specifically, individualism refers to a 
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worldview that centralizes the personal—personal goals, personal uniqueness, and 
personal control—and peripheralizes the social; collectivism refers to a worldview that 
stresses relatedness, belongingness, duty and harmony. Many studies contrast East Asian 
countries and the U.S. as two culturally distant entities, arguing that East Asians are 
generally more collectivistic or have an interdependent self-construal, and Americans, 
particularly European Americans, are generally more individualistic or have an 
independent self-construal (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010; Kitayama and Markus 
2000; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Markus and Schwartz 2010; Triandis 1995). These 
studies also suggest that well-being is more often attained through the realization of 
positive social relationships in collectivistic Asian cultures, but more through personal 
achievement in individualistic European-American cultures. The notion implies that 
interpersonal networks may be larger and stronger among East Asians but smaller and 
weaker among Americans. However, this cultural contrast between the “East” and the 
“West” has also been challenged. A meta-analysis based on empirical evidence from 
1980 to 1999 indicates that among East Asians, only Chinese are more collectivistic than 
European Americans, and Japanese and Koreans are no more collectivistic than European 
Americans (Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier 2002). The findings not only cast doubt 
on the East-West divide on the collectivism-individualism orientation, but also 
demonstrate that East Asia is a culturally diverse region.  
 As Takahashi et al. (2002) has suggested, the current study considers this cultural 
framework of social relations as a heuristic view rather than a theoretical assumption. In 
contrast to cross-cultural psychology that is rarely based on probability sampling 
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(Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010), the study systematically examines interpersonal 
relations across societies using population-representative samples.  
 
Socio-Demographic Structure, 2003-2004 
The contemporary socio-demographic profiles of urban population are considerably 
different between China, Japan, and the U.S. Some of these differences may correspond 
to the distinctive patterns of interpersonal networks across countries. Table 3.1 
demonstrates the cross-national variation in socio-demographic characteristics.  
First, the age structure in Japan is the oldest as expected, with a higher proportion of 
people in the 60-69 age group. However, China’s mean age is not much younger than 
Japan’s, which most likely reveals the consequence of one-child policy. In particular, the 
proportion of people aged 20-29 is smaller in China than either Japan or the U.S. by more 
than 5 percentage points of the urban population. Research suggests that an older 
population is expected to have smaller, more kin-centered, and denser networks because 
of retirement, bereavement, deterioration of health status, or other life-transition events 
(Cornwell, Laumann, and Schumm 2008; McPherson et al. 2006; Schnittker 2007).  
Further, the sex distribution of the urban population varies moderately by country. 
The proportion of male respondents is the highest in the Chinese sample (49.1%) but the 
lowest in the U.S. sample (45.6%). The variation parallels the sex ratio of urban 
population in these countries8. Since men’s networks tend to include less kin members 

8 According to the United Nations Statistics Division, the female/male ratio of urban population, as of 2000, 
is 95.0, 103.8, and 105.2 (women per 100 men) in China, Japan, and the US, respectively. 
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but more non-kin members compared to women’s networks (Marsden 1987), a higher 
male-to-female sex ratio implies a lower proportion of kin in the networks.  
Moreover, the percentage of married people varies significantly across countries, 
with almost 88% of the urban Chinese being married in contrast to 70% in Japan and 
62% in the U.S. Because marriage enlarges kin networks (by connecting in-laws) but 
shrinks friendship networks (by crowding out non-family activities), a population with a 
higher marriage rate is expected to have more kin-centered and denser networks (Kalmijn 
2003; Wellman et al. 1997). The correlation between marriage and total network size, 
however, is unclear. 
Education level also divides by country. On average, Americans and Japanese are 
much more educated than Chinese, who in majority do not graduate from high school. 
Previous research suggests that education is a strong predictor of network structure 
(Fischer 1982; Marsden 1987; McPherson et al. 2006). Specifically, more educated 
people may have both larger kin and non-kin networks. Meanwhile, the proportion of kin 
decreases with the level of education because the growth of kin networks slows down as 
education increases.  
In addition, employment rate is higher in the U.S. and Japan than in China. The 
differential is greater than 20 percentage points. Employment may change the structure of 
personal networks by, for example, expanding non-kin networks (Brashears 2011). Also, 
involvement in paid work reallocates time and energy between family, work, and other 
social life; it may change the component and strength of social networks in addition to 
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network size (Bidart and Lavenu 2005; Degenne and Lebeaux 2005; Wellman et al. 
1997).  
Finally, the urban household size is larger in China and Japan (3.5 persons per 
household) than the U.S. (2.9 persons per household). Household size is shaped by 
multiple decisions including marriage/cohabitation, child rearing, and co-residence with 
elderly parents, all or some of which would jointly determine the structure of 
interpersonal networks (Bidart and Lavenu 2005; Wellman et al. 1997). Larger household 
size may be associated with larger and more kin-centered networks.  
In sum, the socio-demographic profile of urban population differs significantly 
between China, Japan, and the U.S. According to previous research, all the dimensions, 
including age, gender, marital status, education, employment, and household size, are 
related to the distribution of relational resources and thus the structure of interpersonal 
networks. Therefore, when comparing networks across national contexts, it is important 
to take into account of cross-national differences in socio-demographic characteristics. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the link between network structure and socio-demographic 
variables may vary between contexts; however, the majority of the literature represents 
only perspectives from Western societies. 
 
Data and Analyses 
Data 
The study uses data from the 2003 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), the 2003 
Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), and the 2004 U.S. General Social Surveys 
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(GSS). All the surveys include a section of core discussion networks that asked about 
people with whom the respondent discusses important matters. While the network 
modules are not exactly the same across countries, they bear high similarity to promise 
cross-national comparison. In addition, the surveys originally targeted populations with 
slightly different demographic characteristics. Specifically, the CGSS sampled the urban 
population of China aged 18-699; the JGSS sampled the national population of Japan 
aged 20-89; the GSS sampled the U.S. national population aged 18-89. To make these 
samples comparable, the analysis includes only urban residents aged 20-69 from each 
country: 4,745 in the Chinese sample, 1,054 in the Japanese sample, and 1,043 in the 
American sample.    
 
Measures 
The measures of network structure used in the analysis are similar to those used by 
Marsden (1987) and McPherson et al. (2006). First, total size is the number of people 
with whom the respondent discussed important matters (hereafter referred to confidants) 
in the past six months10. Because the respondent only provided further information about 
each confidant for up to five confidants in China and the U.S. and up to four confidants in 
Japan, the rest of network measures are calculated based on the first four confidants 
nominated by the respondent. Kin size is the number of kin confidants, and non-kin size is 
the number of non-kin confidants. Proportion kin is the percentage of kin ties in the 

9 The urban population of China includes residents with permanent urban hukou, valid local urban hukou 
(“blue-seal” hukou or “self-grain” hukou), and rural hukou. To avoid the complication of migrant 
selectivity, this study restricts its China sample to individuals with permanent urban hukou. 
10 The 2003 JGSS does not specify the six-month period. 
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discussion networks. Density refers to the degree of network concentration: higher 
density indicates that confidants of the respondent are more likely to know one another, 
signaling higher network strength. Another indicator of tie strength, frequency of contact, 
is measured by summing up the number of daily contacts (per year) the respondent has 
with each of her/his confidants. Finally, the heterogeneity of confidants regarding gender, 
age, and education is measured by taking the standard deviation of confidants’ age and by 
calculating the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) 11  of confidants’ gender and 
education. 
 
Analyses 
The analyses begin with a comparison of network structure, including size, proportion of 
kin, density, frequency of contact, and heterogeneity, across countries. To evaluate the 
impact of socio-demographic profiles on the cross-national differences in network 
structure, I pool data from each country and conduct regression analyses that consider the 
effects of age, gender, marital status, education, employment, and household size for each 
network measure except heterogeneity12. Specifically, I use negative binomial regression 
for total, kin, and non-kin network size and OLS regression for proportion of kin, density, 
and frequency of contact. Moreover, to assess whether the link between network structure 
and socio-demographic characteristics varies across contexts, I also test the interaction 

11 IQV= ሺͳ െ σ ௜ଶሻ ോ ሺͳ െ ͳ Τ ሻ୩௜ୀଵ , where pi is the proportion of observations in the ith category, and k is 
the number of categories (Agresti and Agresti 1978). 
12 Regression analysis for network heterogeneity is not presented for two reasons. First, cross-national 
variation in network heterogeneity regarding age and education is small and simply aligns with population 
heterogeneity regarding age and education (as shown by Table 3.4). Second, socio-demographic 
characteristics barely explain any cross-national differences in network heterogeneity (results not shown). 
To save space, the study does not present regression results regarding heterogeneity.  
 
 
94
between country and socio-demographic variables in the regression models. Finally, to 
correct underestimated standard errors, all the regression analyses are adjusted for 
clustering effects of country, geographical region, and size of city. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Several structural features of core discussion networks differ significantly across 
countries. First, total network size is the largest in China (3.2 persons), followed by Japan 
(2.91 persons) and then the US (2.23 persons) (Table 3.2). Specifically, only about 5.5% 
of urban Chinese or urban Japanese are socially isolated (i.e., people who report having 
no confidants). In contrast, more than 20% of the urban Americans are isolated. 
Moreover, 34% of the Chinese report having 5 or more people with whom they can 
discuss important matters, but only about 14% of the Americans or Japanese report so. It 
is notable that very few Japanese have a network size of 5; the anomaly is possibly due to 
the different survey procedure of the JGSS13. In addition, differences in total network 
size are evenly contributed by differences in kin and non-kin networks. Chinese and 
Japanese both have a higher number of kin and non-kin confidants than Americans do. 
Finally, the difference in network size between Chinese and Japanese is mostly driven by 
the number of non-kin ties. That is, the size of their kin networks is equivalent, but 

13 The JGSS first asked the respondent to nominate up to four confidants. For those who nominated four, a 
following question is asked about how many more confidants they have. The total number of confidants is 
calculated by summing up the answers to the two questions. However, the CGSS and GSS first asked the 
respondent to report a total number of confidants, which is followed by the nomination of up to five 
confidants.  
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Chinese have a slightly larger (yet statistically significant) non-kin networks than 
Japanese.  
 Although network size (either total, kin, or non-kin) is significantly different 
between countries, the variation in the proportion of kin is relatively small (Table 3.3). 
The average kin proportion is only slightly higher in the U.S. (59%) compared to Japan 
(57%) and China (56%). The result suggests that the importance of kinship in discussing 
important matters is likely to be equal across countries.  
 Further, network density varies greatly across countries. In particular, Chinese 
networks are the densest (0.93 on a scale of 1); that is, confidants are the mostly to know 
one another (Table 3.3). In contrast, Japanese networks are the least dense (0.74), which 
indicates weaker network strength. The result may be surprising to those who expect that 
Chinese and Japanese networks should look more alike because they share “collectivist” 
culture. In addition, the frequency of contact with confidants is also the highest among 
Chinese but the lowest among Japanese (Table 3.3). Nonetheless, the country difference 
is not statistically significant.  
 Lastly, the heterogeneity of core discussion networks along the dimension of 
gender, age, and education varies across countries (Table 3.4). China has the lowest 
network heterogeneity in all these dimensions, especially gender. Specifically, Chinese 
discussion networks are significantly more gender-segregated than American discussion 
networks. In addition, Chinese are also more likely to discuss important matters with 
those who resemble them in age and education; however, the cross-national differences 
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are not large. In fact, the variation in the network heterogeneity of age and education 
highly aligns with the variation in population heterogeneity of age and education.  
 
Regression Analyses  
Size 
The cross-national differences in network size persist even after socio-demographic 
profiles are taken into account (Table 3.5). In fact, holding social-demographic 
characteristics constant makes the country differences in total network size and non-kin 
network size slightly larger (Models 2 and 8). Model 2 shows that compared to 
Americans (reference group), Chinese and Japanese have significantly larger discussion 
networks. As expected, network size is related to social-demographic status: the total size 
is smaller for older adults and men, but it is larger for those who are married, more 
educated, employed, and live in a larger household. Additionally, the relationship 
between size and social-demographic characteristics is mostly reversed for kin and non-
kin networks (Models 5 & 8). For example, being male and being employed are related to 
smaller kin networks but larger non-kin networks. Also, being older, living in a marital 
relationship, and having a larger household are associated with larger kin networks but 
smaller non-kin networks. However, education is related to larger discussion networks 
regardless of the kinship status of networks although the relationship is much stronger for 
non-kin networks.  
 Furthermore, the relationship between network size and socio-demographic 
factors are not equal across countries. Models 3, 6, and 9 in Table 3.5 examine the 
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interaction between country and socio-demographic variables. Results suggest that only 
Chinese and Japanese have a smaller network size at older ages mainly because their non-
kin networks shrink as they get older. Additionally, the education gradient in network 
size is much steeper among Americans. The level of education predicts a significantly 
larger size of kin networks and non-kin networks. In contrast, education more modestly 
expands individuals’ discussion networks in China and Japan. 
 
Proportion Kin and Density 
As the descriptive statistics shown earlier, there is no significant variation in the kin 
proportion of discussion networks across countries. However, when socio-demographic 
characteristics are taken into account, Chinese and Japanese networks become less kin-
oriented than their American counterparts (Table 3.6, Model 2). Moreover, most of the 
socio-demographic factors are linked to proportion of kin in an expected direction among 
all the countries. The exception is that in the U.S., age is not related to more kin-oriented 
networks and being employed does not predict a lower proportion of kin confidants 
(Table 3.6, Model 3).  
 Further, the cross-national variation in network density also persists after the 
socio-demographic profiles are taken into consideration (Table 3.6, Model 5). As 
discussed earlier, confidants who share the same ego are the most likely to know one 
another in China and the least likely to know one another in Japan. The effects of socio-
demographic factors on network density are quite similar across countries (Table 3.6, 
Model 6). Only age and household size interact with country, which shows that American 
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networks are not denser among older adults or among individuals living in a larger 
household. 
 
Frequency of Contact 
The frequency of contact with confidants differs significantly between countries only 
when socio-demographic factors are adjusted (Table 3.7, Model 2). In particular, Chinese 
and Japanese contact their confidants less often than their American counterparts, by 38 
and 27 daily contacts per year, respectively. Moreover, the interaction between country 
and network size, a significant correlate of total number of daily contacts, also suggests 
that Americans contact each of their confidants more frequently than their Chinese and 
Japanese counterparts (Table 3.7, Model 3). On average, having one more confidant is 
related to an increase in daily contacts by 94 times per year for Americans, but an extra 
confidant only predicts an increase in daily contacts by 77 times per year for Chinese and 
by 80 times per year for Japanese. 
 
Discussion 
The study compares core discussion networks between urban Chinese, Japanese, and 
Americans. It shows that structural aspects of discussion networks, including size, density, 
proportion of kin confidants, and frequency of contact, vary considerably between 
countries. However, differences in network structure are not attributable to cross-national 
variation in socio-demographic characteristics. In fact, network differences become even 
larger when the effects of socio-demographic characteristics are taken into account. 
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Specifically, the study demonstrates that Chinese and Japanese have larger networks than 
Americans do. This is true for both kin networks and non-kin networks. Also, Chinese 
networks are slightly larger than Japanese networks. Moreover, the kin proportion of 
discussion networks is the highest among Americans, followed by Japanese and then 
Chinese. The finding suggests that American networks may be more family-centered than 
networks in China and Japan. Further, Chinese networks are the most densely knitted, 
followed by American networks and then Japanese networks. Notably, in terms of 
network density, the gap between China and Japan is even larger than the gap between 
U.S. and China or between U.S. and Japan. In addition, Americans maintain the highest 
frequency of contact with their confidants, followed by Japanese and then Chinese. When 
network size is controlled for, both total number and marginal number of daily contacts 
per year are the highest among Americans. Finally, the relationship between socio-
demographic characteristics and network structure are not always the same across 
contexts. The most notable examples include that higher level of education more strongly 
predicts larger networks in the U.S., and that age is related to smaller and more kin-
centered networks in Japan and China only. 
 The findings based on core discussion networks do not support the conventional 
cultural notion of Eastern collectivism versus Western individualism. In particular, while 
Chinese have the largest and densest networks, they also contact their confidants the least 
frequently. In contrast, Americans may have the smallest networks but they contact their 
confidants most often. Indeed, none of the countries seems to have a “better” or stronger 
network structure than another. Additionally, significant differences in network structure 
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are found not only between “culturally distant” societies (between China/Japan and the 
U.S.) but also between “culturally proximate” societies (China and Japan). To be sure, 
the perception that East Asia is culturally homogeneous, particularly regarding the 
tendency of collectivism, is not supported by the empirical findings based on core 
discussion networks. A notable example is the comparison of network density across 
China, Japan, and the U.S. Therefore, the study argues that the prevalent cultural notion 
of social relations, Eastern collectivism versus Western individualism, is over-simplified 
and requires more network studies to verify.  
 The current study has several limitations. First, although the module of core 
discussion networks used by each country is highly comparable, the cross-national 
comparison may still suffer from systematic errors induced by different survey 
administration and questionnaire designs. For example, interviewer selection and training, 
number and types of questions preceding the network module, and overall response rate 
may all introduce measurement errors (Fischer, 2009). Second, the study is based on 
cross-sectional data collected in a specific period of time. Any exogenous shocks relevant 
to core discussion networks in a country at the time of survey administration may change 
the results of cross-national comparison. For example, Brashears (2011) suggests that the 
high level of social isolation in the 2004 GSS may be generated by exogenous shocks 
particular to that year: a substantial proportion of the social isolates may report having no 
confidants due to lack of discussion subjects rather than lack of people to discuss 
important matters. Future studies will benefit from tracking the same comparative cases 
(countries) over time with the same network measurement embedded in a similar 
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questionnaire. Third, the study only examines core discussion networks, which are part of 
an individual’s broader social networks. Whether cross-national differences in core 
discussion networks are consistent with those in broader social networks will be an 
important topic to investigate in the future. Lastly, the study only covers urban population. 
Given that China, Japan, and the U.S. are unequally urbanized, with 43, 66, and 81 
percent of the total population residing in urban areas as of 2005 respectively14, the urban 
samples may not be equally representative of their national populations. Particularly in 
the case of China, the rural-urban contrast is rather stark after decades of imbalanced 
development and restriction on rural-to-urban migration (Whyte 2010). Therefore, 
comparing urban populations between China, Japan, and the U.S. may underestimate the 
overall differences across countries. 
Despite the limitations, the study contributes to the literature of social networks and 
comparative sociology in at least three aspects. First, it systematically examines the 
diversity of interpersonal networks across national contexts. Second, it shows that cross-
national differences in the structure of interpersonal networks are barely explained by 
variation in socio-demographic characteristics. Finally, the study contests the 
conventional notion of Eastern collectivism vs. Western individualism, arguing that core 
discussion networks do not follow such a cultural typology in China, Japan, and the U.S.  
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Table 3.1: Socio-demographic characteristics by country (weighted) 
  US Japan China 
Age (%) 
20-29 20.4  20.9  14.7  
30-39 20.1  22.5  25.8  
40-49 27.0  17.7  25.0  
50-59 20.8  21.0  20.7  
60-69 11.7  17.8  13.9  
Mean (year) 42.8  43.9  43.7  
Male (%) 45.6  48.5  49.1  
Married (%) 62.0  69.9  87.9  
Educationa (%) 
Less than high school 8.8  12.2  50.2  
High school 46.7  45.7  30.1  
Junior college 8.8  15.7  13.1  
University or above 35.7  26.4  6.6  
Employedb (%) 70.4  72.1  47.5  
Household size (%) 
1 12.4  7.1  2.2  
2 35.9  20.0  17.0  
3 20.9  23.2  41.0  
4 17.5  27.3  18.7  
5+ 13.3  22.4  21.1  
Mean (person) 2.9  3.5  3.5  
a The education system is slightly different across countries. In Japan, "Junior college" includes those who graduated 
from 2-year college, college of technology, or vocational school. In China, "High school" includes people who graduated 
from high school, vocational high school, technical school, and professional school equivalent to high-school level. 
"Junior college" includes people who graduated from specialized college. b The employed includes those who work full-
time and part-time.  
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Table 3.2: Size of core discussion networks by country (weighted) 
    Total Network      Kin Network      Non-kin Network   
Network size US Japan China  US Japan China  US Japan China 
0 20.8% 5.6% 5.4% 37.2% 24.9% 31.2% 50.4% 39.2% 44.6% 
1 18.5% 15.4% 17.1% 31.1% 31.9% 29.5% 22.5% 24.0% 14.8% 
2 19.6% 23.2% 17.6% 17.4% 24.3% 17.5% 16.8% 19.0% 15.2% 
3 18.3% 21.0% 16.7% 10.1% 13.1% 11.8% 6.6% 12.1% 11.9% 
4 9.3% 20.5% 9.6% 4.0% 5.8% 10.1% 3.8% 5.7% 13.5% 
5 7.3% 1.8% 18.6% - - - - - - 
6+ 6.1% 12.6% 15.1% - - - - - - 
Mean Size 2.23  2.91  3.24  1.13  1.43  1.40 0.91  1.21  1.35  
95% CI 2.11-2.35 2.80-3.02 3.18-3.30 1.05-1.21 1.35-1.50 1.36-1.44 0.83-0.99 1.13-1.29 1.30-1.40 
Mode 0  2  5  0  1  0  0  0  0  
N 1,043  1,054  4,745   1,043  1,054  4,745   1,043  1,054  4,745  
Note: The size of kin and non-kin networks is calculated only based on the first four confidants nominated by the respondent. Because of this, the sum of kin size and non-kin size does 
not exactly match the overall network size. 
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Table 3.3: Proportion kin, density, and frequency of contact of core discussion networks by country (weighted) 
  US Japan China 
Proportion Kina   
0.00  20.8% 20.5% 27.4% 
0.01-0.33 11.8% 14.3% 11.6% 
0.34-0.66 23.5% 21.9% 13.9% 
0.67-0.99 6.7% 7.7% 5.8% 
1.00  37.2% 35.6% 41.3% 
Mean proportion kin  0.59  0.57  0.56  
95% CI 0.55-0.62 0.55-0.60 0.55-0.58 
N 805 991 4,469 
Network Densityb  
<0.25 5.6% 11.9% 2.1% 
0.25-0.49 4.1% 10.0% 1.9% 
0.50-0.74 14.1% 17.9% 7.1% 
>0.74 76.2% 60.1% 88.9% 
Mean density 0.85  0.74  0.93  
95% CI 0.83-0.88 0.72-0.77 0.93-0.94 
N 607  802  3,639  
Frequency of Contacta (daily contacts per year)  
4-156 25.1% 19.1% 22.2% 
157-312 27.3% 29.8% 26.1% 
312-468 23.9% 24.3% 20.0% 
468-624 23.7% 26.8% 31.7% 
Mean number of daily contacts per year 362.8  361.2  376.4  
95% CI 349.6-375.9 349.6-372.7 370.0-382.7 
N 805  991  4,469  
a Among those who nominate at least one confidant. b Among those who nominate at least two confidants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109
Table 3.4: Heterogeneity of core discussion networks by country (weighted)  
  US Japan China 
Gender Heterogeneity (Index of Qualitative Variance) 
0 23.2% 31.0% 35.6% 
0<IQV<0.90 42.3% 40.3% 37.3% 
0.90<=IQV<=1 34.5% 28.8% 27.1% 
Mean  0.70  0.62  0.57 
95% CI 0.66-0.73 0.59-0.65 0.56-0.59 
Population heterogeneity of gender 1.00  1.00  1.00  
Age Heterogeneity (Standard deviation of 
confidants' age)    
<5 30.9% 33.0% 39.3% 
5-<10 19.1% 12.3% 15.6% 
10-<15 24.0% 22.2% 18.8% 
>=15 26.0% 32.4% 26.3% 
Mean 10.04  10.49  9.46  
95% CI 9.39-10.69 9.96-11.02 9.22-9.71 
Population heterogeneity of age 13.18  13.94  12.67  
Education Heterogeneity (Index of Qualitative 
Variance)    
0 34.43% 28.93% 37.06% 
0.5 13.87% 15.80% 18.65% 
0.5<IQV<0.75 38.33% 40.78% 30.68% 
0.75<=IQV<=1 13.38% 14.49% 13.62% 
Mean 0.43  0.46  0.41  
95% CI 0.39-0.46 0.44-0.49 0.39-0.42 
Population heterogeneity of education 0.85  0.90  0.83  
Note: Network heterogeneity is calculated only for those who had at least two confidants. 
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Table 3.5: Negative binomial regression of total, kin, and non-kin network size on country and social-demographic factors 
  Total network size Kin network size Non-kin network size 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
China 0.387*** 0.455*** 1.006*** 0.257*** 0.156** 0.544*** 0.389*** 0.617*** 1.006***
Japan 0.251*** 0.254*** 0.883*** 0.295*** 0.182*** 0.540** 0.205*** 0.315*** 0.800** 
Age -0.003*** 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.007*** 0.000 
Male -0.071*** -0.165***  -0.214*** -0.253***  0.078** -0.072 
Married 0.044** 0.023 0.300*** 0.329*** -0.184*** -0.304***
High school 0.111*** 0.401*** -0.024 0.269** 0.247*** 0.401***
Junior college 0.186*** 0.447*** 0.055 0.160 0.293*** 0.622***
University or above 0.247*** 0.748*** 0.102** 0.502*** 0.383*** 0.808***
Employed 0.058** 0.061 -0.047** 0.032 0.133*** 0.061 
Household size 0.019** 0.003 0.058*** 0.038* -0.028* -0.033 
China × Age -0.007***  -0.002 -0.007** 
Japan × Age -0.011***  -0.002 -0.017***
China × Male 0.132*** 0.045 0.221** 
Japan × Male -0.002 0.094 -0.089 
China × Married 0.024 -0.055 0.159* 
Japan × Married -0.011 -0.031 0.094 
China × High school -0.315***  -0.320** -0.183 
China × Junior college -0.289* -0.125 -0.364* 
China × University and above -0.616***  -0.489***  -0.560***
Japan × High school -0.073 -0.125 0.185 
Japan × Junior college -0.100 0.130 -0.199 
Japan × University and above -0.368***  -0.325** -0.190 
China × Employed -0.004 -0.082 0.070 
Japan × Employed 0.009 -0.114 0.181* 
China × Household size 0.016 0.034 -0.009 
Japan × Household size 0.013 -0.015 0.039 
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Constant 0.779*** 0.686*** 0.145 0.077 -0.183** -0.561*** -0.100** -0.033 -0.431** 
N 6,805 6,805 6,805 6,805 6,805 6,805 6,805 6,805 6,805 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: OLS regression of proportion kin and density on country and socio-demographic factors 
  Proportion kin Density 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
China -0.005 -0.097*** 0.000 0.101*** 0.075*** 0.000 
Japan 0.030 -0.029* 0.000 -0.069*** -0.086*** -0.340***
Age 0.002*** 0.000 0.001** -0.001 
Male -0.055*** -0.025 -0.006 -0.024 
Married 0.140*** 0.167*** 0.046*** 0.082***
High school -0.078*** 0.000 -0.017* 0.000 
Junior college -0.080*** 0.000 -0.034*** 0.000 
University or above -0.084*** 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
Employed -0.041*** 0.005 -0.020** -0.011 
Household size 0.016*** 0.020** 0.008*** -0.005 
China × Age 0.002 0.001 
Japan × Age 0.004** 0.005***
China × Male -0.046 0.021 
Japan × Male 0.031 0.016 
China × Married -0.044 -0.052 
Japan × Married -0.016 -0.022 
China × High school -0.034 0.021 
China × Junior college 0.024 0.044 
China × University and above 0.013 0.019 
Japan × High school -0.074 -0.008 
Japan × Junior college 0.055 0.018 
Japan × University and above -0.025 0.033 
China × Employed -0.047 -0.011 
Japan × Employed -0.077** -0.038 
China × Household size 0.001 0.014 
Japan × Household size -0.015 0.019* 
Constant 0.573*** 0.480*** 0.482*** 0.828*** 0.770*** 0.876***
N 6,269 6,269 6,269 5,020 5,020 5,020 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: OLS regression of frequency of contact on country and socio-demographic factors  
  1  2  3  
China 7.483  -38.405*** 0.000  
Japan -10.143  -26.987*** 0.000  
Age -0.479*** -1.431*** 
Male -12.837*** -15.114*** 
Married 3.206  13.431* 
High school 7.918** 0.000  
Junior college 9.873** 0.000  
University or above 2.712  0.000  
Employed 1.046  -7.636  
Household size 5.752*** 2.665  
Network size 79.449*** 93.919*** 
China × Age 1.374*** 
Japan × Age 0.205  
China × Male 7.830  
Japan × Male -21.431** 
China × Married -13.938  
Japan × Married -8.217  
China × High school 1.646  
China × Junior college -17.196  
China × University and above 14.286  
Japan × High school 11.020  
Japan × Junior college 1.276  
Japan × University and above 15.260  
China × Employed 14.268* 
Japan × Employed 8.055  
China × Household size 3.350  
Japan × Household size 2.741  
China × Network size -16.741*** 
Japan × Network size -13.815*** 
Constant 360.566*** 139.645*** 153.091*** 
N 6,263 6,263 6,263 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
